Finding and verifying the nucleolus of cooperative games = Kooperatív játékok nukleoluszának kiszámítása és verifikálása by Benedek, Márton et al.
         
 
CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS | KRTK-KTI MŰHELYTANULMÁNYOK 
 
INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC AND REGIONAL STUDIES,  
BUDAPEST, 2020 
 
Finding and verifying the nucleolus of cooperative 
games 
 
MÁRTON BENEDEK – JÖRG FLIEGE – TRI-DUNG NGUYEN
 
 
 
CERS-IE WP – 2020/21  
May 2020 
 
https://www.mtakti.hu/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/CERSIEWP202021.pdf 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CERS-IE Working Papers are circulated to promote discussion and provoque 
comments, they have not been peer-reviewed.  
Any references to discussion papers should clearly state that the paper is preliminary. 
Materials published in this series may be subject to further publication.
         
 
CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS | KRTK-KTI MŰHELYTANULMÁNYOK 
 
INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC AND REGIONAL STUDIES,  
BUDAPEST, 2020 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The nucleolus offers a desirable payoff-sharing solution in cooperative 
games, thanks to its attractive properties. Although computing the 
nucleolus is very challenging, the Kohlberg criterion offers a method for 
verifying whether a solution is the nucleolus in relatively small games 
(number of players n at most 15). This approach becomes more challenging 
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1) sets of coalitions. Second, we exploit these results and introduce a novel 
descent-based constructive algorithm to find the nucleolus efficiently. We 
demonstrate the performance of the new algorithms by comparing them 
with existing methods over different types of games. Our contribution also 
includes the first open-source code for computing the nucleolus of 
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Kooperatív játékok nukleoluszának kiszámítása és 
verifikálása 
BENEDEK MÁRTON – JÖRG FLIEGE – TRI-DUNG NGUYEN
 
ÖSSZEFOGLALÓ 
A nukleolusz az egyik legelterjedtebb megoldáskoncepció a kooperatív 
játékelméletben, köszönhetően vonzó tulajdonságainak. Ugyan kiszámítása 
nem tartozik ezek közé, a Kohlberg-kritérium lehetőséget ad rá hogy egy 
kifizetésvektorról eldöntsük az a nukleolusz-e kisebb játékokban (legfeljebb 15 
játékos). Ez nehézkessé válik nagyobb játékokban, ugyanis a kritériumban 
megjelenik exponenciális sok koalícióhalmaz, ahol bármely halmaz lehet 
exponenciálisan nagy méretű. A cikkünk célja kettős. Egyrészt meghatározunk 
egy fejlesztett Kohlberg-kritériumot mely során elegendő legfeljebb (n-1) 
koalícióhalmaz ún. kiegyensúlyozottságát vizsgálni. Másrészt felhasználva az 
eredményeket bevezetünk egy új konstruktív ereszkedő algoritmust a 
nukleolusz hatékony kiszámítására. Bemutatjuk a módszer eredményességét 
összevetve számos már meglévő algoritmussal különböző játéktípusokon. Ezen 
kívül bevezetjük az első nyílt forrás kódot közepesen nagy méretű játékok (30 
játékosig) nukleoluszának kiszámítására. 
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Abstract
The nucleolus offers a desirable payoff-sharing solution in cooperative games, thanks to its attrac-
tive properties —it always exists and lies in the core (if the core is non-empty), and it is unique. The
nucleolus is considered as the most ‘stable’ solution in the sense that it lexicographically minimizes
the dissatisfactions among all coalitions. Although computing the nucleolus is very challenging, the
Kohlberg criterion offers a powerful method for verifying whether a solution is the nucleolus in rel-
atively small games (i.e., with the number of players n ≤ 15). This approach, however, becomes
more challenging for larger games because of the need to form and check a criterion involving possi-
bly exponentially large collections of coalitions, with each collection potentially of an exponentially
large size. The aim of this work is twofold. First, we develop an improved version of the Kohlberg
criterion that involves checking the ‘balancedness’ of at most (n − 1) sets of coalitions. Second, we
exploit these results and introduce a novel descent-based constructive algorithm to find the nucleolus
efficiently. We demonstrate the performance of the new algorithms by comparing them with existing
methods over different types of games. Our contribution also includes the first open-source code for
computing the nucleolus for games of moderately large sizes.
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1 Introduction
Cooperative games model situations where players can form coalitions to jointly achieve some objective.
Assuming that it is more beneficial for the players to work together, a natural question is how to divide
the reward of the collaboration among the players in such a way that ensures the stability of the grand
coalition, i.e. avoiding any subgroup of players to break away in order to form their own coalition and
increase their total payoff. Solution concepts in cooperative games provide the means to achieve this.
In a cooperative game (with transferable utilities), each coalition of players is associated with a value,
a real number that represents what that coalition could achieve by working together, independently of
other players. We are looking for a stable allocation of the value associated with the grand coalition,
that includes every player in the game. A natural requirement from such an outcome is to allocate
exactly the grand coalition value, and to do that individually rationally, i.e. each player should receive
at least her stand-alone value. There are games where no such outcome exists, however, for our purposes
in particular, we consider games where at least one individually rational outcome exists.
Applying the same concept to all groups of players, coalitionally rational outcomes form the core,
guaranteeing to every coalition at least the amount that they could achieve by breaking away from
the grand coalition. In this sense, core outcomes can be considered stable. However, it is possible
that no payoff vector satisfies this condition, and a core outcome might not exist. Furthermore, in the
appealing case of a non-empty core, one might find multiple core payoffs, offering possibly different
levels of stability.
There are other solution concepts which provide outcomes that are, in a certain sense, as stable
as possible. The first such solution concept is called the least core, which minimizes the worst level
of dissatisfaction, i.e. the difference of what a coalition could achieve on their own and the amount
allocated to the coalition, among all the coalitions. Note that least core payoffs always exist, but such
a payoff vector might still not be unique.
Least core outcomes minimize the worst (largest) dissatisfaction level among all coalitions over the set
of efficient payoff vectors, that allocate exactly the grand coalition value. Since there might be multiple
of such outcomes, we might be interested in minimizing the second (third, etc.) largest dissatisfaction
level of the remaining coalitions among these outcomes. By lexicographically minimizing the non-
increasingly ordered dissatisfactions of all coalitions, we arrive at one of the most widely known solution
concepts in cooperative game theory, the nucleolus, which is the ‘most stable’ individually rational
outcome. In this paper we are focusing on the computation and the verification of the nucleolus.
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The nucleolus was introduced in 1969 by Schmeidler [1] as a solution concept with attractive prop-
erties: it always exists (in a game with individually rational outcomes), it is unique, and it lies in the
core, if the core is non-empty. Despite the desirable properties that the nucleolus has, its computation
is, however, very challenging because the process involves the lexicographical minimization of 2n excess
values, where n denotes the number of players. While there is a few classes of games whose nucleoli can
be computed in polynomial time (e.g. [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]), it has been shown that finding the nucleolus
is NP-hard for many classes of games, such as the utility games with non-unit capacities [6] and the
weighted voting games [8].
While finding the nucleolus is very difficult, Kohlberg [9] provides a necessary and sufficient condition
for a given imputation to be the nucleolus, which we will describe in the next section. This set of
criteria is particularly useful for relatively small games (e. g. less than 10 players). The verification of it,
however, becomes time consuming when the number of players exceeds 15, and becomes computationally
extremely demanding when the number of players exceeds 20, even if we have an educated guess on
the nucleolus based on the structure of a game. This is because the criterion involves the formation of
collections of (tight) coalitions from all 2n possible coalitions and iteratively verifying if unions of these
collections are ‘balanced’ in a way to be described in details in Section 2.2. The first aim of our work
is to resolve these issues and propose a new improved set of criteria for verifying the nucleolus.
Kopelowitz [10] suggested using nested linear programming (LP) to compute a closely related solu-
tion concept, the kernel of a game. This encouraged a number of researchers to focus on the computation
of the nucleolus using LPs, rather than sharpening the Kohlberg criterion1. For example, Kohlberg [12]
presents a single LP with O(2n!) constraints which later on is improved by Owen [13] to O(4n) con-
straints (at the cost of having larger coefficients). Puerto and Perea [14] recently introduced a different
single-LP formulation with O(4n) constraints and O(4n) decision variables and with coefficients in
{−1, 0, 1}. The nucleolus can also be found by solving a sequence of LPs. However, either the number
of LPs involved is exponentially large ([15], [16]) or the sizes of the LPs are exponential ([17], [18], [19],
[20]). Our second aim is to directly solve the lexicographical minimization problem via introducing a new
descent-based approach. We compare our method with classical sequential LP methods (primal and dual
sequences as described in [17]), the prolonged simplex method of [18], and the simplex implementation
for finding the nucleolus from Derks and Kuipers [19].
The four key contributions of our work are:
1The only result we are aware of is the nonlinear approximation described in [11].
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• We present a new set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a solution to be the nucleolus in
Section 3.1. The number of collections of coalitions to be checked for balancedness is at most
(n− 1) (instead of exponentially large as in the original Kohlberg criterion).
• We derive a new lexicographical descent algorithm for finding the nucleolus in Section 4. The new
algorithm is distinguished from existing methods in that we directly solve the lexicographical min-
imization problem by iteratively finding improving directions through the balancedness checking
procedure within the improved Kohlberg criterion.
• We demonstrate the performance of the proposed methods through numerical tests on various
types of games in Section 5.
• We develop the first open-source code for computing the nucleolus of moderately large sizes in
[21]. For completeness it also includes the implementation of algorithms from [17], [18] and [19].
In addition, we provide further contributions such as:
• The balancedness condition is essentially equivalent to solving a linear program with strict inequal-
ities —a somewhat undesirable situation in mathematical programming. We provide an efficient
tool for checking the balancedness condition in Section 3.3, requiring solving less number of LPs.
• While checking the Kohlberg criterion, we might end up having to store collections of exponentially
large number of coalitions. We provide a method for reducing the storage size of these collections
to at most (n− 1) coalitions in Section B.
2 Notations and Preliminaries
2.1 Notations
Let n be the number of players and N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of all the players. A coalition S is
a subset of players; i. e. S ⊆ N . The characteristic function v : 2N 7→ R maps each coalition to a
real number v(S) (such that v(∅) = 0). An outcome in a game is a payoff vector (payoffs, for short)
x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) of real numbers, with xi (i ∈ N ) being the share of player i. We focus on profit
games and assume that it is more desirable to have higher shares. All our results can be extended to
cost games through transforming the characteristic function to the corresponding profit game.
Let us denote x(S) = ∑i∈S xi. Given the total payoff v(N ), efficient outcomes x, also called
preimputations, satisfy
∑
i∈N xi = v(N ). Let us denote by PI the set of these: PI = {x ∈ Rn :
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x(N ) = v(N )}. The set of imputations, denoted by I, contain efficient outcomes that satisfy individual
rationality ; that is, xi ≥ v({i}),∀i ∈ N . The core of the game is the set of all efficient payoffs x such
that no coalition has an incentive to break away, i.e. x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ( N .
For each outcome x, the excess value of a coalition S is defined as d(S,x) := v(S)−x(S), which can
be regarded as the level of dissatisfaction the players in coalition S have with respect to the proposed
payoff vector x. Then the least core is defined as follows: the set of preimputations {x ∈ PI : d(x,S) ≤
ε∗ ∀S ( N ,S 6= ∅} form the least core, where ∗ is the smallest value such that the set is nonempty.
For any imputation x, let Θ(x) = (Θ1(x),Θ2(x), . . . ,Θ2n(x)) be the vector of all the 2
n excess
values at x sorted in a non-increasing order; i.e., Θi(x) ≥ Θi+1(x) for all 1 ≤ i < 2n. Let us denote
Θ(x) <L Θ(y) if there exists r ≤ 2n such that Θi(x) = Θi(y), ∀1 ≤ i < r and Θr(x) < Θr(y). Then
ν(N , v) ∈ I is the nucleolus (ν for short) if Θ(ν) <L Θ(x), ∀x ∈ I, x 6= ν.
If we only require x and ν to be preimputations, we arrive at the definition of the prenucleolus, which
can be seen as the most stable efficient outcome. In this paper every result is focusing on the nucleolus,
hence throughout the paper we consider only games with non-empty imputation set. However, the aim
is to develop algorithms applicable to a general class of games, thus we make no further assumptions
on the characteristic function. Moreover, with suitable modifications, every result can be applied to the
prenucleolus, making them applicable to every cooperative game (with transferable utilities).
For each collection Q ⊆ 2N , let us denote the size of Q by |Q|. We associate each collection Q
with a weight vector in R|Q| with each element denoting the weight of the corresponding coalition in
Q. Throughout this paper, we use bold font for vectors and italic font for scalars. Whenever it is clear
from context, we are going to omit the argument x from maximal dissatisfaction levels k, tight sets T0
and Tk, collection of tight sets Hk, and so on (the latter notions introduced in Section 2.2).
For S ⊆ N , let us denote by e(S) the characteristic vector of S in {0, 1}n whose ith element is
equal to one if and only if player i is in coalition S. With this, for all x ∈ Rn, we have x(S) =∑
i∈S xi = x
Te(S). Furthermore we can consider (linear) spans and the rank of collections: coalition
S is in the linear span of collection Q if its characteristic vector e(S) is in span({e(T ) : T ∈ Q}) and
rank(Q) := rank({e(T ) : T ∈ Q}). Next, we formally define the concept of balancedness.
Definition 1. A collection of coalitions Q ⊆ 2N is balanced if there exists a weight vector ω ∈ R|Q|>0
such that e(N ) = ∑S∈Q ωSe(S). Given a collection T0 ⊆ 2N , a collection Q ⊆ 2N is called T0-balanced
if there exist weight vectors γ ∈ R|T0|≥0 and ω ∈ R|Q|>0 such that e(N ) =
∑
S∈T0 γSe(S) +
∑
S∈Q ωSe(S).
Remark 1. We make the following observations about balancedness:
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a) Balancedness implies T0-balancedness for any T0, while for T0 = ∅ the two concepts are equivalent.
b) All results in this paper are concerned with the nucleolus. These results and the corresponding
algorithms to be described can be adapted for the prenucleolus by setting T0 = ∅.
2.2 Algorithmic view of the Kohlberg criterion
We first formalize the concept of balancedness and summarize the main results of Kohlberg [9] from
an algorithmic viewpoint. For any efficient payoff distribution x ∈ PI, Kohlberg [9] first defines the
following sets of coalitions: T0(x) = {{i}, i = 1, . . . , n : xi = v({i})}, H0(x) = {N} and Hk(x) =
Hk−1(x) ∪ Tk(x), k = 1, 2, . . . , where for each k ≥ 1,
Tk(x) = argmax
S6∈Hk−1(x)
{v(S)− x(S)} , k(x) = maxS6∈Hk−1(x) {v(S)− x(S)} .
Here, Tk(x) includes all coalitions that have the same excess value k(x) and 1(x) > 2(x) > . . .,
while T0(x) contains the players for which x is on the boundary of violating individual rationality. We
call Tk(x) the set of ‘tight’ coalitions in the sense that coalition S belongs to Tk(x) if and only if the
constraint v(S) − x(S) = k(x) is active/tight. In the followings, the terms ‘collection of coalitions’
(collection for short) and ‘subset of the power set 2N ’ are equivalent and are used interchangeably.
For any collection of coalitions Q, let us define
Y (Q) = {y ∈ Rn : y(S) ≥ 0 ∀S ∈ Q, y(N ) = 0} .
We have Y (Q) 6= ∅ since 0 ∈ Y (Q). The first key result in Kohlberg [9] that will be exploited in this
work is the following lemma:
Lemma 1 (Kohlberg [9]). Given a collection T0 ⊆ 2N , a collection T ⊆ 2N is T0-balanced if and only
if y ∈ Y (T0 ∪ T ) implies y(S) = 0, ∀S ∈ T .
This result allows the author to define two sets of equivalent properties regarding a sequence of
collections (Q0, Q1, . . .):
Definition 2. (Q0, Q1, . . .) has Property I if for all k ≥ 1, the following claim holds: y ∈ Y (∪kj=0Qj)
implies y(S) = 0, ∀S ∈ ∪kj=1Qj.
Definition 3. (Q0, Q1, . . .) has Property II if for all k ≥ 1, ∪kj=1Qj is Q0-balanced.
The main result of [9] can be summarized in the following theorem:
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Theorem 1 (Kohlberg [9]). For games with a non-empty imputation set, the followings are equivalent:
(a) x is the nucleolus; (b) (T0(x), T1(x), . . .) has Property I; (c) (T0(x), T1(x), . . .) has Property II.
For the sake of completeness, in Appendix D we provide a proof of Theorem 1 slightly different than
the one in [9]. To appreciate the practicality of the Kohlberg criterion and for convenient development
later, we present the algorithmic view of the criterion in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: (Original) Kohlberg algorithm for verifying if a payoff vector is the nucleolus
of a cooperative game.
Input: Game (N , v), imputation x ∈ I;
Output: Conclude if x is the nucleolus or not;
1. Initialization: Set H0 = {N}, T0 = {{i} : xi = v({i}), i = 1, . . . , n} and k = 1;
while Hk−1 6= 2N \ {∅} do
2. Set Tk = argmax
S6∈Hk−1
{v(S)− x(S)};
if (∪kj=1Tj) is T0-balanced then
3. Set Hk = Hk−1 ∪ Tk, k = k + 1 and continue
else
4. Stop the algorithm and conclude that x is not the nucleolus
end
end
5. Conclude that x is the nucleolus.
In this algorithm, we iteratively form the tight sets Tj (j = 0, 1, . . .) until either all the coalitions
are included, and we conclude that the input payoff vector is the nucleolus (i.e. stopping at Step 5), or
stop at a point where the union of the tight coalitions is not T0-balanced (in Step 4), in which case we
conclude that the payoff vector is not the nucleolus.
3 An improved Kohlberg criterion
The Kohlberg criterion, as described in Section 2.2, offers a powerful tool to assess whether a given
payoff distribution is the nucleolus by providing necessary and sufficient conditions. These conditions
can be used in relatively small or well-structured games, where a potential candidate for the nucleolus
can be easily identified and where checking the balancedness of the corresponding tight sets can be done
easily (possibly analytically). For larger games, it is inconvenient to apply the Kohlberg criterion as it
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could involve forming and checking the balancedness of exponentially large number of subsets of tight
coalitions (this is the case when the while loop in Algorithm 1 takes an exponentially large number of
steps), each of which could be of exponentially large size. This section aims to resolve these issues.
3.1 Bounding the number of iterations to (n− 1)
The key idea to check the Kohlberg criterion in a more efficient way is to note that, once we have
obtained and verified the T0-balancedness of ∪kj=1Tj , we do not have to be concerned about those
coalitions that belong to span(∪kj=1Tj). In brief, this is because once a collection is T0-balanced, its
span is also T0-balanced as formalized in the following lemma:
Lemma 2. For any collection T0 ⊆ 2N , the following results hold:
(a) If a collection T is T0-balanced, then span(T ) is also T0-balanced
2.
(b) If collections U, V are T0-balanced then U ∪ V and span(U) ∪ span(V ) are also T0-balanced.
(c) If U is T0-balanced and U ⊆ V , then span(U) ∩ V is also T0-balanced.
We provide a proof of Lemma 2 in Appendix E. With these results, we can provide an improved
Kohlberg algorithm as shown in Algorithm 2.
The differences between Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 1 are: (a) the stopping condition of the while
loop has been changed from Hk−1 6= 2N \{∅} to rank(Hk−1) < n, and (b) the search space at Step 2 has
been changed from S 6∈ Hk−1 to S 6∈ span(Hk−1). As a result, we have the following desirable property:
Theorem 2. The while-loop in Algorithm 2 terminates after at most (n− 1) iterations and it correctly
decides whether a given imputation is the nucleolus.
Proof. First, by the construction in Step 2 of the algorithm, Tk ∩ span(Hk−1) = ∅ and hence, by Step
3, we have that rank(Hk) = rank(Hk−1 ∪ Tk) keeps increasing. Therefore,
n ≥ rank(Hk) = rank(Hk−1 ∪ Tk) ≥ rank(Hk−1) + 1 ≥ rank(H0) + k = k + 1,
and hence the algorithm (i.e. the while loop) terminates in at most (n − 1) iterations. Here, we also
note that the algorithm terminates at either Step 4 or Step 5 with complementary conclusions.
2Lemma 2.4 from [22].
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Algorithm 2: Improved Kohlberg Algorithm for verifying if a payoff vector is the nucleolus.
Input: Game (N , v), imputation x ∈ I;
Output: Conclude if x is the nucleolus or not;
1. Initialization: Set H0 = {N}, T0 = {{i} : xi = v({i}), i = 1, . . . , n} and k = 1;
while rank(Hk−1) < n do
2. Find Tk = argmax
S6∈span(Hk−1)
{v(S)− x(S)};
if (∪kj=1Tj) is T0-balanced then
3. Set Hk = Hk−1 ∪ Tk, k = k + 1 and continue;
else
4. Stop the algorithm and conclude that x is not the nucleolus.
end
end
5. Conclude that x is the nucleolus.
Proving that the algorithm correctly decides whether an impuation is the nucleolus is equivalent to
showing that (a) if x is the nucleolus then the algorithm correctly terminates at Step 5, and (b) if the
algorithm terminates at Step 5, then the input payoff vector must be the nucleolus.
Part (a): We first note that, although the sequences of Tk and Hk generated from Algorithm 2
are generally different from those in Algorithm 1, these are the same in the initialization and the first
iteration; that is, T0, T1, H0, H1 are the same in both algorithms. Therefore, if x is the nucleolus, then
T1 must be T0-balanced as a direct result from the Kohlberg criterion described in Theorem 1. Thus,
the algorithm goes through to Step 3 at k = 1. Suppose, for the purpose of deriving a contradiction,
that the algorithm goes through to Step 4 instead of Step 5, for some index k > 1; that is (∪kj=1Tj) is
not T0-balanced. By Lemma 1, there exists y ∈ Rn such that
y(S) ≥ 0,∀S ∈ ∪kj=0Tj ; y(N ) = 0; y(S ′) > 0, for some S ′ ∈ ∪kj=1Tj . (1)
Notice, however, that ∪k−1j=1Tj is T0-balanced by the construction in Step 3 of the previous iteration.
Therefore, S ′ 6∈ Hk−1 since otherwise Lemma 1 is violated. Thus, S ′ ∈ Tk and hence (1) leads to
(x + y)(S) ≥ x(S),∀S ∈ Tk; (x + y)(S ′) > x(S ′), for some S ′ ∈ Tk.
As a result
d(S,x + y) ≤ d(S,x),∀S ∈ Tk; d(S ′,x + y) < d(S ′,x), for some S ′ ∈ Tk;
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that is, for all coalitions in Tk, the corresponding excess values for (x + y) are not greater than that of
x with at least one strict inequality for some coalition S ′. Thus,
ΦTk(x + y) <L Φ
Tk(x), (2)
where, for each collection of coalitions Q, ΦQ is the non-increasingly ordered excess values with respect
to only those coalitions in Q. Since Hk−1 is T0-balanced by the construction in Step 3 of the previous
iteration, span(Hk−1) is also T0-balanced by Lemma 2. Thus, y(S) = 0, ∀S ∈ span(Hk−1) and
Φspan(Hk−1)(x + y) =L Φ
span(Hk−1)(x). (3)
From (2) and (3) we have
Φspan(Hk−1)∪Tk(x + y) <L Φspan(Hk−1)∪Tk(x). (4)
Note that (4) also holds if we scale y by any positive factor δ, i. e.
Φspan(Hk−1)∪Tk(x + δy) <L Φspan(Hk−1)∪Tk(x). (5)
For all S 6∈ (span(Hk−1) ∪ Tk) we have v(S) − x(S) < k. Thus, there exists δ > 0 small enough
such that x + δy is an imputation and that
v(S)− (x + δy)(S) < k, ∀S 6∈ (span(Hk−1) ∪ Tk). (6)
Results (5) and (6) imply that the | span(Hk−1)∪Tk| largest excess values at x are lexicographically
larger than those at (x + δy). As a result, Φ(x) is lexicographically larger than Φ(x + δy) considering
all coalitions, which means x is not the nucleolus, i. e. we have arrived at a contradiction.
Part (b): If the algorithm bypassed Step 4 and went to Step 5, then (∪kj=1Tj) is T0-balanced for all
k until rank(Hk−1) = n. Let z be the nucleolus; then by its definition, its worst excess value should be
no larger than the worst excess value of x, which is equal to 1. Thus, the excess value of z over any
coalition, including those in T1, must be at most 1; i. e.
(z− x)(S) ≥ 0, ∀S ∈ T1.
Notice that (z − x)(N ) = 0 and (z − x)(S) ≥ 0, ∀S ∈ T0 by the construction of T0 and because z ∈ I.
Then since T1 is T0-balanced, we have by Lemma 1 that (z− x)(S) = 0 for all S ∈ T1. Using a similar
argument, given that x and z are lexicographically equivalent on span(T1) and since z is the nucleolus,
we also have (z− x)(S) ≥ 0,∀S ∈ T2. Thus,
(z− x)(S) ≥ 0,∀S ∈ T1 ∪ T2.
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Again, given that (T1 ∪T2) is T0-balanced, we have by Lemma 1 that (z−x)(S) = 0 for all S ∈ T1 ∪T2.
We can continue and use an induction argument to show that (z − x)(S) = 0 for all S ∈ Hk−1, k ≥ 1.
Given that rank(Hk−1) = n, we have x = z, i.e. x is the nucleolus.
Remark 2. Step 2 in both Algorithms 1 and 2 still involves comparing vectors of exponential lengths.
The key finding in Theorem 2, however, is to show that Step 2 of Algorithm 2 is not repeated more than
(n− 1) times (instead of possibly exponential in the original Kohlberg criterion described in Algorithm
1). There are structured games such as weighted voting games, network flow games and coalitional skill
games in which Step 2 can be executed efficiently. We refer the readers to [20] for details.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of Algorithm 2 in Section 5. Before that, let us discuss how to
resolve some other computationally demanding tasks of our algorithm.
3.2 Reducing the sizes of the tight sets
When checking the Kohlberg criterion we might end up having to store an exponentially large number
of coalitions. The computational requirements of checking T0-balancedness depend entirely on the size
of the tight sets we encounter. Therefore, it is of particular interest to find compact representations of
large tight sets. We provide a method for reducing the size of Hk to at most (n− 1). This is achieved
by replacing tight sets with their compact representations.
Lemma 3. The following statements hold:
(a) The collection T is T0-balanced if and only if there exists γ ∈ R|T0|≥0 , ω ∈ R|T |>0, µ ∈ R such that∑
S∈T0
γSe(S) +
∑
S∈T
ωSe(S) + µe(N ) = e(N ). (7)
(b) Suppose T contains a T0-balanced subcollection Q. Then T is T0-balanced if and only if there exists
γ ∈ R|T0|≥0 , ω ∈ R|T\Q|>0 , µ ∈ R|Q| such that∑
S∈T0
γSe(S) +
∑
S∈T\Q
ωSe(S) +
∑
S∈Q
µSe(S) = e(N ). (8)
The proof of Lemma 3 is provided in Appendix E.
Lemma 3b allows us to represent each Hk by a collection Rk of size rank(Hk) ≤ n with the following
updating procedure. We need to have span(Rk) = span(Hk−1∪Tk) in order to guarantee at most (n−1)
iterations. Therefore starting from R0 = H0, we get Rk by expanding Rk−1 from a T0-balanced Tk only
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with coalitions that increase its rank. As a result, span(Rk) = span(Hk), while rank(Rk) = |Rk|. We
denote such a subset Rk = rep(Tk;Rk−1) and call Rk the representative of Hk.
As a result we can modify Algorithm 2 to be an Improved Kohlberg Algorithm with compact represen-
tation (denoted by IKAcr in the numerical results of Section 5). In Step 3 we can set Rk = rep(Tk;Rk−1)
instead of Hk = Hk−1 ∪ Tk without changing balancedness whatsoever. This means we replace all tight
sets Tk and store only a representative Rk of their union for the subsequent steps. Accordingly, as
Rk−1 is a collection of coalitions with full rank, the stopping criterion can be simplified to checking the
cardinality of the representative set Rk−1. The correctness of the algorithm can be proven very similarly
to Theorem 2 using Lemma 3b.
3.3 A fast algorithm for checking balancedness
According to the Kohlberg criterion, to check T0-balancedness of T we need to check for the existence
of γ ∈ R|T0|≥0 and ω ∈ R|T |>0 such that
e(N ) =
∑
S∈T0
γSe(S) +
∑
S∈T
ωSe(S).
Solymosi and Sziklai [23] [Lemma 3] provide an approach by solving |T | linear programs as follows. For
each C ∈ T , let
q∗C =
maxωC : ∑S∈T0 γSe(S) +
∑
S∈T
ωSe(S) = e(N ), (γ, ω) ∈ R|T0|+|T |≥0
 .
Then T is T0-balanced if and only if q
∗
C > 0,∀C ∈ T . Notice, however, that the collection T appearing
in the Kohlberg criterion could be exponentially large, and hence solving all the |T | linear programs is
not practical for larger games. Solymosi [17] (see Routine 3.2) presents a faster approach that involves
at most rank(T ) linear programs. We improve upon these results by exploiting the knowledge of a
T0-balanced subcollection in T to reduce the upper bound of rank(T ) in [17].
Exploiting Lemma 3, we can formulate an efficient algorithm that checks T0-balancedness of a
collection T ⊆ 2N with a known T0-balanced subcollection Q ( T (possibly Q = ∅) by finding the
largest balanced subcollection within T , as described in Algorithm 3 below.
When we check the T0-balancedness of (∪kj=1Tj), through (Rk−1∪Tk) exploiting Lemma 3 and using
Algorithm 3, (Rk−1∪Tk) and Rk−1 play the role of T and Q respectively. In this case, when we initialize
U as span(Q)∩ T , the set U essentially equals its representative set. However, this is not necessary the
case any more when we perform the update in Step 4 of Algorithm 3. Moreover, Algorithm 3 can be
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Algorithm 3: Algorithm finding largest T0-balanced subcollection
Input: Collection T with T0-balanced subcollection Q ( T ;
Output: U ⊆ T largest T0-balanced subcollection;
1. Initialization: Set U = span(Q) ∩ T ;
while rank(U) < rank(T ) do
2. Find γ∗ ∈ R|T0|≥0 , ω∗ ∈ R|T\U |≥0 , µ∗ ∈ R|U | that solve
argmax
γ,ω,µ
 ∑S∈T\U ωS :
∑
S∈T0
γSe(S) +
∑
S∈T\U
ωSe(S) +
∑
S∈U
µSe(S) = e(N )
 (9)
if ω∗ = 0 or (9) is infeasible then
3. Stop the algorithm and output U ( T .;
else
4. Set U = span(U ∪ {S : ω∗S > 0}) ∩ T ;
end
end
5. Output U = T .
used for general Q, not necessarily only those that are equal to their own representative set. Both cases
can be easily treated by replacing U with its representative set in the corresponding occurrences (Steps
1 and/or 4 of Algorithm 3), not effecting balancedness and hence the outcome of the algorithm. In
the following, we establish the improvement in the number of iterations required by our balancedness-
checking subroutine, Algorithm 3.
Theorem 3. Collection T is T0-balanced if and only if Algorithm 3 terminates at Step 5 with U = T ,
and the algorithm terminates after at most (rank(T )− rank(Q)) iterations.
Proof. The while loop terminates as rank(U) keeps increasing via the construction of U in Steps 1
and 4; that is, the set U is enlarged by adding coalitions outside its span, starting from rank(Q).
Thus, the algorithm terminates at either Step 3 or 5 and we need to prove that the corresponding
conclusions from the output U are correct. Also, notice that since span(U) ∩ T = U , we have U ( T if
rank(U) < rank(T )3.
If the algorithm terminates at Step 3, then ω∗ = 0 or (9) is infeasible and hence T is not T0-balanced,
3Therefore we could replace the stopping condition rank(U) = rank(T ) with U = T or |U | = |T | as well.
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as otherwise we should have found a feasible ω∗ 6= 0. If the algorithm terminates at Step 5 then, prior
to that, we have rank(U) = rank(T ) in order for the while loop to terminate. The construction of U in
Step 4 ensures that U is a T0-balanced set by Lemmas 2b, 2c and 3b. Thus, T = span(U) ∩ T is also
T0-balanced by Lemma 2c.
3.4 Nucleolus-defining coalitions and characterization sets
We conclude the first part of this article on the improved Kohlberg criterion by linking it with an
important development in the nucleolus literature on the characterization set introduced by Granot
et al. [22] and the B-nucleolus by Reijnierse and Potters [24].
A cooperative game G(N , v) is represented by (2n−1) coalitional values and although the nucleolus
is defined as a function of all these values, i.e. lexicographical minimization of all the (2n − 2) excess
values, Granot et al. [22] and Reijnierse and Potters [24] show that the nucleolus can be determined by
a subset of coalitions in the sense that lexicographical minimization with those coalitions as admissible
ones will determine the nucleolus. Reijnierse and Potters [24] show that there exists a characterization
set in every game with a size of at most 2(n − 1) coalitions. Although the authors emphasize that
identifying this characterization set (or the B−set) would be as hard as finding the nucleolus itself,
the result is still quite striking since this essentially means that we can ignore (2n − 2(n − 1)) other
coalitional values in calculating the nucleolus. The authors also show that the characterization set or
the B-nucleolus can be identified efficiently in a number of games, including the assignment games, the
balanced matching games, standard tree games, etc. We first define the characterization set.
Definition 4. For a collection of coalitions F ∈ 2N , the F-nucleolus of the game G(N , v), denoted as
ν(N ,F , v), consists of imputations that lexicographically minimizes the excess values of coalitions in F .
A set F is called a characterization set (or a B-set) if ν(N ,F , v) = ν(N , 2N , v) = ν(N , v).
We now investigate how the improved Kohlberg criterion is linked to the concepts in [22, 24].
We prove that the set of coalitions generated from the improved Kohlberg criterion form ‘special’
characterization sets. We first identify the set of coalitions which are critical in defining the nucleolus.
Definition 5. A coalition S is nucleolus-defining in game G(N , v) if a small perturbation on its coali-
tional value can lead to a change in the nucleolus. Formally, for all δ > 0, there exists || < δ such
that ν(N , v˜) 6= ν(N , v), where v˜(S) = v(S) +  and v˜(S ′) = v(S ′) for all N ⊃ S ′ 6= S. All remaining
coalitions are called non-nucleolus-defining.
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Theorem 4. The set of all nucleolus-defining coalitions is precisely ∪kr=1Tr, where Tr, r = 1, . . . , k are
the collections of coalitions generated by the improved Kohlberg Algorithm 2 on the nucleolus x.
Proof. We prove two parts: (a) for all j ≤ k, each S ∈ Tj is a nucleolus-defining coalition and (b) all
the remaining ones are non-nucleolus-defining.
Let S0 ∈ Tj for some 1 ≤ j ≤ k. Suppose on contradiction that S0 is non-nucleolus-defining, i.e.,
there exists  > 0 and small enough such that if we change v(S0) to v(S0) +  the nucleolus of the new
game is still x. By setting 0 <  < j−1 − j4 we have j < v(S0) − x(S0) < j−1. Therefore the tight
sets for x are T1, . . . , Tj−1, {S0}, Tj\S0, Tj+1, . . . , Tk. Here, note that both ∪j−1i=1Ti and ∪j−1i=1Ti ∪ S0 are
balanced due to x being the nucleolus (according to the Kohlberg criterion). By Lemma 1, there exists
α > 0 and β > 0 such that e(N ) = ∑S∈∪j−1i=1Ti αSe(S) = βS0e(S0) +∑S∈∪j−1i=1Ti βSe(S). Thus,
βS0v(S0) =
∑
S∈∪j−1i=1Ti
(αS − βS)e(S),
that is S0 ∈ span(∪j−1r=1Tr), contradicting the construction Tj ∩ span(∪j−1r=1Tr) = ∅ in Algorithm 2. Part
(a) of the theorem is proven.
Now let S0 6∈ ∪kj=1Tj . We note, however, that S0 ∈ span(∪kj=1Tj) since span(∪kj=1Tj) has full rank.
This means there exists a smallest index r ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that S0 6∈ ∪rj=1Tj while S0 ∈ span(∪rj=1Tj).
This construction leads to v(S0)− x(S0) > r > j , ∀j < r. Let us set δ = v(S0)− x(S0)− r. Then for
any || < δ, if we change v(S0) to v(S0) +  the nucleolus of the new game is still x because according
to Algorithm 2, all the steps still lead to the same collection of coalitions ∪kj=1Tj .
While all characterization sets lead to the same unique nucleolus, it can be more desirable if the
subset of excess values generated from the restricted game can carry more information about the worst
excess values in the original game. For example, consider a game with three players where v({1, 2, 3} =
9, v({1}) = v({2}) = v({3}) = 0 and v({1, 2}) = v({2, 3}) = v({3, 1}) = 5. It can be verified
that both {{1}, {2}, {3}} and {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {3, 1}} form characterization sets. However, the former
characterization set contains all non-nucleolus-defining coalitions while the latter contains all nucleolus-
defining ones. It can be seen that the excess values generated from the latter provide more information
on the most unhappy coalitions.
We define a meaningful characterization set as one that contains nucleolus-defining coalitions only.
Following the result from Theorem 4, the next corollary provides us a method to construct these
characterization sets.
4We require the second inequality only for j > 1.
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Corollary 1. A meaningful characterization set can be constructed as ∪ki=1Fi, where for each i =
1, . . . , k, Fi is a ‘representation’ of Ti; that is, Fi ⊂ Ti and rank(Fi) = rank(Ti). The smallest size of
meaningful characterization set is n + k − 1 which is constructed from minimals Fi, i = 1, . . . , k, i.e.,
when rank(Fi) = |Fi| = rank(Ti).
Theorem 4 and Corollary 1 are related to the results in Granot et al. [22] and Reijnierse and Potters
[24], however, we show exactly how some characterization sets are constructed. We skip the proof of
Corollary 1 for brevity as it is quite straightforward based on the result of Theorem 4 and it shares
analogies with the proof on the size of characterization sets in Reijnierse and Potters [24], which makes
use of the nested LP sequence.
4 Lexicographical descent algorithm for finding the nucleolus
Our improved Kohlberg criterion allows us to formulate a constructive algorithm that not only verifies
whether a given imputation is the nucleolus, but also gives means to find it, in case the given candidate
is not the desired payoff. This new algorithm fits into a general iterative descent framework as follows:
• Starting from any imputation x ∈ I we perform a (local) optimality test.
• If x fails the test, we generate an improving direction y and step size α (here, ‘improving’ is w.r.t.
the lexicographical ordering of the corresponding dissatisfactions).
• We update x = x + αy and repeat the procedure until no further improving direction is found.
In this scheme, the optimality test is derived from the new Kohlberg criterion developed in Section
3, improving directions are generated using duality, while step sizes are found exactly to guarantee
necessary and sufficient change in the imputation and its tight collection of coalitions.
Our new algorithm also fits somewhat into the simplex framework for linear programming: improving
directions are chosen using considerations similar to reduced costs, and the step size provides the pivoting
rule through a sort of minimal ratio test. Indeed, we are moving on the facets of polytopes in Maschlers
scheme, but not necessarily from vertex to vertex, like most traditional simplex implementations do.
4.1 Finding improving directions
Algorithm 3 not only handles the tedious strict positivity constraints related to balancedness, it essen-
tially finds the largest T0-balanced subcollection in T , starting from a previously identified (possibly
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empty) balanced subcollection Q. Suppose that Algorithm 2 with compact representation (Algorithm
5) terminates in Step 4, which happens precisely when Algorithm 3 exits with ω∗ = 0 or (9) is infeasible,
while rank(U) < rank(T ). In the former case, we found the largest T0-balanced subcollection U in T ,
but since T \U 6= ∅, T is not T0-balanced. In the latter case, there is no T0-balanced subcollection in T
(more precisely, the largest one is the empty set). In both cases we know that precisely the collection
T \ U 6= ∅ is responsible for the lack of T0-balancedness.
Recall that in iteration k of Algorithm 2 (with compact representation), when we check T0-balancedness
with Algorithm 3, input T is (Rk−1 ∪ Tk) while the T0-balanced subcollection Q is Rk−1, and we get
the output U . For sake of simplicity we use T as (Rk−1 ∪ Tk) and U as the corresponding output from
Algorithm 3.
If T is not T0-balanced, it is possible to generate an improving direction y, such that moving from
x to (x + αy) will fulfill all of the following three objectives:
(a) not changing the excess of coalitions in span(Rk−1),
(b) remaining in the set of imputations and not increasing the excess of coalitions in U ,
(c) decreasing the excess of coalitions in T \ U .
In other words, the change from x to (x + αy) will increase the satisfaction of the most dissatisfied
unbalanced coalitions, while maintaining the excess of the already settled balanced coalitions. In this
subsection we focus on how to generate an improving direction while Subsection 4.2 is devoted to the
calculation of the optimal step size.
When Algorithm 3 terminates with rank(U) < rank(T ) the system∑
S∈T0
γSe(S) +
∑
S∈T\U
ωSe(S) +
∑
S∈U
µSe(S) = e(N )
ωQ > 0
γS , ωP ≥ 0 ∀S ∈ T0,P ∈ T \ U
µS ∈ R ∀S ∈ U
(10)
is infeasible for all Q ∈ T \ U . Therefore, using Farkas’ lemma we get
{y ∈ Rn : y(Q) > 0,y(P) ≥ 0, ∀P ∈ T0 ∪ (T \ U),y(S) = 0, ∀S ∈ U ∪ {N}} 6= ∅.
Note that the preceding result holds for any Q ∈ T \ U . While the corresponding y might differ for
different Q, we can take the average (or sum) of all these to arrive at a common, normalized y in
{y ∈ Rn : y(Q) ≥ 1, ∀Q ∈ T \ U,y(P) ≥ 0,∀P ∈ T0,y(S) = 0, ∀S ∈ U ∪ {N}} (11)
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Furthermore, Lemma 3b shows that whenever we iteratively check whether a collection of coalitions
∪kj=1Tj satisfies T0-balancedness for all k or not, it is sufficient to require strict positivity from the weights
of the current new set of coalitions Tk, if we already found that the collection is T0-balanced up to level
(k− 1). The lemma is not only useful to make checking of balancedness easier, as shown in Section 3.3,
it also yields an improved system via (11). In iteration k, if T is not T0-balanced, then in (11) we can
require y(Q) = 0 from all coalitions Q ∈ ∪k−1j=1Tj ∪ {N} and still get a feasible system. Additionally,
because for all S ∈ ∪k−1j=1Tj ∪ {N} there exists λ ∈ R|Rk−1| such that y(S) =
∑
Q∈Rk−1 λQy(Q), the set
{y ∈ Rn : y(Q) ≥ 1, ∀Q ∈ Tk \ U,y(P) ≥ 0,∀P ∈ T0,y(S) = 0, ∀S ∈ Rk−1 ∪ (U ∩ Tk)} (12)
is non-empty as well. We call vectors y in (12) improving directions. Since improving directions are
defined through a feasible set of constraints, there could be many different improving directions, and
we have the freedom to choose an objective function to optimize over that set. The following section
determines the optimal step size, also shedding light on the most suitable objective function to choose.
4.2 Step size
A feasible point y in (12) is an improving direction in the sense that moving along y from our current
point (which is not the nucleolus) improves the satisfaction of the coalitions that are currently worst
off and causing the lack of balancedness, while still maintaining the satisfaction of previously checked
balanced subcollections and ensuring that we stay in the imputation set for small enough step size.
When determining a suitable step size α > 0 for a given improving direction y, we naturally want to
choose α large enough in order to avoid small steps that do not result in changes in T , since T is not
T0-balanced. Also, we want to increase α only until we experience a change in T (or in T0) in the hope
that the new collection is T0-balanced.
Suppose that, at iteration k, we are currently at imputation x. For all coalitions S, the change of
excess as we move in direction y with step size α is
d(S,x + αy)− d(S,x) = v(S)− (x(S) + αy(S))− (v(S)− x(S)) = −αy(S).
Currently the largest dissatisfaction among coalitions not in span(Rk−1) is k(x) = d(S,x) for any
S ∈ Tk(x). Thus, for sufficiently small α > 0 the new maximal dissatisfaction is k(x+αy) = d(S,x+αy)
for some (possibly more than one) S ∈ Tk(x). Fix one such coalition as S˜, then the change in the
maximal dissatisfaction is k(x + αy)− k(x) = −αy(S˜).
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We are essentially interested in the tightness of coalitions measured as the difference of their excess
from the maximal dissatisfaction, that is how far they are from being tight. Specifically, we are interested
in the change of their tightness
(d(S,x + αy)− k(x + αy))− (d(S,x)− k(x)) = α(y(S˜)− y(S)) ≥ α(1− y(S)), (13)
with the last inequality due to y(S˜) ≥ 1.
This brings us back to the practical question of how to choose improving directions from the cone
determined by (12). Since every feasible point of that set is an improving direction we can use, we have
the freedom to choose an objective function to optimize over this set. In order to control minS∈Tk\U y(S)
as well as to make the bound we used in (13) sharp, we choose to minimize
∑
S∈Tk\U y(S).
Recall that when we check the T0-balancedness of ∪kj=1Tj in iteration k, we choose y solving
min
y
∑
Q∈Tk\U
y(Q)
s.t. y(Q) ≥ 1 ∀Q ∈ Tk \ U
y(P) ≥ 0 ∀P ∈ T0
y(S) = 0 ∀S ∈ U \ Tk
(ID(T0;Tk;U))
Thus, for every optimal solution y of ID(T0;Tk;U), we have y(S˜) = 1. As we increase α from 0, we
see that the tightness of coalition S decreases if y(S) > 1, the tightness does not change if y(S) = 1, and
it increases if y(S) < 1. By increasing tightness we mean that the difference k(x + αy)− d(S,x + αy)
decreases. Let us denote the collection of coalitions with increasing tightness as J = {S /∈ span(Rk−1)∪
Tk : y(S) < 1}, the coalitions that are candidates to enter the tight set as we make a step.
We know that d(S, x) < k(x) for all coalitions S /∈ span(Rk−1) ∪ Tk. Hence, there exists α > 0
sufficiently small such that
d(S,x)− αy(S) = d(S,x + αy) ≤ k(x + αy) = k(x)− αy(S˜) ≤ k(x)− α.
Rearranging these terms, we get d(S,x) + α(1− y(S)) ≤ k(x). Candidates of coalitions satisfying the
latter relation with equality for large enough α are in collection J , thus we increase α until we reach
equality for some coalition in J . However, we also need to bound α such that we stay in the imputation
set. Taking both constraints into account, and introducing N0 = {j ∈ N \ T0 : yj < 0}, the optimal
step size is
α = min
({
k(x)− d(S,x)
1− y(S) : S ∈ J
}
∪
{
xj − v({j})
−yj : j ∈ N0
})
, (14)
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Figure 1: Optimal step size
the smallest step size for which we experience either Tk(x) 6= argmax
S6∈span(Rk−1)
{v(S)− (x + αy)(S)} or
T0 6= {{i} : xi + αyi = v({i}), i ∈ N}.
Figure 1 captures how the tight set changes as we move from x to (x + αy). At x, the largest dis-
satisfaction outside of the already settled span(Rk−1) belongs to coalitions in Tk. Their dissatisfactions
decrease with varying rates, depending on y, but with no smaller than 1. The new largest dissatisfaction
k(x + αy) is determined by coalitions in argminS∈Tk\U {y(S)}.
In Figure 1, the dissatisfaction of coalitions in J increases (relative to the moving target of k(x +
αy)), again with varying speed depending on y. The coalition first meeting argminS∈Tk\U {y(S)} enters
the tight set5.
4.3 Lexicographical descent algorithm
Now that we have all necessary elements at our disposal, we formulate the new algorithm for calculating
the nucleolus of a cooperative game.
Algorithm 4 starts with an arbitrarily chosen imputation. If, at the current point, the tight set Tk
fails to pass a balancedness requirement related to the Kohlberg criterion, we generate an improving
direction and a step size.
Beside the descent-based nature of the algorithm as presented in the preceeding sections, Algorithm
4 also shares some similarities with the simplex method for linear programming, as finding an improving
direction y and a suitable step size α in Step 3 of the algorithm is similar to a pivot step in the simplex
5If there are multiple, all of them enter the tight set.
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Algorithm 4: Algorithm computing the nucleolus of a cooperative game.
Input: Game (N , v) with I 6= ∅;
Output: ν nucleolus of game (N , v);
1. Initialization: Set x ∈ I arbitrary, R0 = {N} and k = 1;
while |Rk−1| < n do
2. Find k(x) = maxS /∈span(Rk−1)
d(S,x), Tk(x) = {S /∈ span(Rk−1) : d(S,x) = k},
T0(x) = {{i} : xi = v({i}), i ∈ N}, and U ⊆ (Rk−1 ∪ Tk) generated by Algorithm 3;
if Tk \ U 6= ∅ then
3. Find y solving ID(T0;Tk;U) and α using (14). Update x = x +αy and go to Step 2.;
else
4. Set Rk = rep(Tk;Rk−1), and k = k + 1;
end
end
5. x = ν is the nucleolus.
algorithm. Inside the while loop the algorithm keeps ’pivoting’ until T0-balancedness is achieved, while
the iterations of the loop correspond to solving LPs in the sequential LP formulation of the nucleolus
(cf. [17]). The overall algorithm can also be interpreted as an active-set or column generation approach,
because checking the balancedness of a collection of (primal) tight coalitions is nothing else than solving
relaxed dual programs in the aforementioned LP sequence (cf. [19]).
Example 1. Consider the 3-player game v with coalition values v({1}) = 1, v({2}) = 2, v({3}) = 5,
v({1, 2}) = 6, v({1, 3}) = 7, v({2, 3}) = 8, and v(N ) = 12. For readability, during this example we use
superscripts to distinguish between different imputations, while subscripts of maximum dissatisfaction
levels k and tight sets Tk are used to keep track of iterations. We are using Algorithm 4 to find the
nucleolus ν from a starting imputation x0 = [1, 4, 7].
First, we find that our distance to the boundary of the core is 1, hence 1(x
0) = 1. Also, currently
the largest infeasibility among core inequalities belongs to constraint x1 + x2 ≥ 6. Therefore, T1(x0) =
{{1, 2}}, while T0(x0) = {{1}} because x01 = v({1}). It is easy to see that the current tight set T1(x0) is
not T0(x
0)-balanced. In the algorithm we run into an infeasible system when checking the balancedness,
so we can find improving directions by solving ID(T1(x
0);T0(x
0); {N}), for example y = [−1, 0, 1].
Notice that we measure the distance from the boundary with a special signed distance; in the interior
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of the core the distance from the boundary is understood to be negative. Thus, we can move even further
along the direction after reaching the core, until we can not decrease the distance any more. This
happens precisely when the distances from both constraints (x3 ≥ 5) and (x1 + x2 ≥ 6) are −0.5, that
is when x1 = [2.5, 4, 5.5], 1(x
1) = −0.5, T1(x1) = {{1, 2}, {3}} and T0(x1) = ∅. This is similar to a
pivot step in a simplex-like algorithm, where coalition {3} enters the basis. According to (14), the step
size chosen in direction y is α = 1.5. After this step, we find that T1(x
1) is T0(x
1)-balanced, therefore
we expand R0 with an arbitrary element of T1(x
1) as rank(R0 ∪ T1(x1)) = 2. By doing so we lift those
inequality constraints that limit the decrease; that is, throughout the remaining execution of the algorithm
those constraints remain satisfied with equality at the current largest excess level of 1(x
1) = −0.5.
The set of imputations having the coalitions in T1(x
1) being tight at 1 = −0.5 actually form the
least core of the game. At the current point x1, among constraints not in span(R1), we are closest to
violating x1 + x3 ≥ 7 with 2(x1) = −1. Also we have that T0 remains empty at x1 and the tight set
T2(x
1) = {{1, 3}} is not T0-balanced, so we find an improving direction parallel to the set of least core
payoffs. That is, the unique solution of ID(T2(x
1);T0;R1) is y = [1,−1, 0], and we can take a step size
of α = 1/4 until coalition {2, 3} becomes tight as well. The resulting point is x2 = [2.75, 3.75, 5.5]> with
largest excess 2(x
2) = −1.25, T0 = ∅ and tight set T2(x2) = {{1, 3}, {2, 3}}. Since T1(x2) ∪ T2(x2) is
T0-balanced and rank(R1 ∪ T2(x2)) = n we found the nucleolus ν = x2.
In the followings we establish results regarding the convergence of Algorithm 4 and its connection
to sequential LP methods. The results also justify why we call Algorithm 4 a lexicographical descent
method.
Lemma 4. Suppose that at iteration k, Algorithm 4 goes through to Step 3 and updates x to (x +αy).
Then we have Θ(x + αy) <L Θ(x). Furthermore,
(a) if U ∩ Tk = ∅, then k(x + αy) < k(x),
(b) if U ∩ Tk 6= ∅, then k(x + αy) = k(x) = k(ν) and Tk(x + αy) = Tk(ν).
Proof. Let us start by noting that by the definition of y solving ID(T0;Tk;U) and α in (14), the new
point (x + αy) ∈ I if x ∈ I. Additionally x(S) = (x + αy)(S) for all S ∈ span(Rk−1), also due to y
solving ID(T0;Tk;U). As a result, both Θ(x) and Θ(x + αy) contain (and start with) the same excess
values for coalitions S with excess d(S, ν) ≥ k−1(ν). Therefore, in order to make the lexicographical
comparison, it is sufficient to focus on the truncated ordered excess vectors over the set 2N \span(Rk−1),
i.e., between Θ2
N \span(Rk−1)(x) and Θ2N \span(Rk−1)(x + αy).
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k+1(x + αy)
k(x) =
k(x + αy) 1
d(S,x) . . .
S1 U ∩ Tk...
S|U |+1
y(S|U|+1)
S|U |+2
Tk
y(S|U|+2)
...
Q1
y(Q1)
Q2J y(Q2)
Q3
y(Q3)
...
Figure 2: Changes of tight coalitions at a pivot step when U 6= ∅.
(a) The first component of both truncated ordered excess vectors is a value corresponding to a tight
coalition S ∈ Tk(x). Since y(S) ≥ 1 for all S ∈ Tk(x) and α > 0, we have that k(x +αy) < k(x)
(as Figure 1 demonstrates) and therefore Θ(x + αy) <L Θ(x) in this case.
(b) However, if U ∩Tk 6= ∅, then we have y(Q) = 0 for all Q ∈ U since y is a solution of ID(T0;Tk;U),
hence k(x) = k(x + αy) = d(Q,x) for Q ∈ U . Note that at Step 3 of Algorithm 4, we have
Tk \ U 6= ∅. Since y(S) ≥ 1 for all S ∈ Tk \ U , we also have U ∩ Tk(x) = Tk(x + αy) ( Tk(x), as
Figure 2 demonstrates. Consequently, Θ(x+αy) <L Θ(x) because of Θ
2N \span(Rk−1)(x+αy) starts
with less excess values of k(x) than Θ
2N \span(Rk−1)(x); that is |Tk(x + αy)| < |Tk(x)|. On the
other hand, since Tk(x+αy) is T0-balanced, we have k(x+αy) = k(ν) and Tk(x+αy) = Tk(ν).
Remark 3. We have the following observations by Lemma 4:
• Lemma 4 justifies naming Algorithm 4 lexicographical descent. Starting from an arbitrary imputa-
tion, we follow a trajectory of imputations by generating improving directions and step sizes, with
the corresponding ordered vector of excesses keep strictly lexicographically decreasing in every step
of the trajectory. The only other ‘descent’ method [19] that we are aware of for general cooperative
games does not have this property.
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• Due to the strict lexicographical descent, during Algorithm 4 we never circulate in the imputation
set x ∈ I.
• Furthermore, Algorithm 4 is connected to the classical sequential LP methods by Lemma 4b: as
soon as we have U ∩Tk 6= ∅, that is, we have found a balanced (sub)collection in the new tight set,
we have solved the k-th LP of the sequence due to primal-dual feasibility. Notice, however, that
even in that case we could make a further step in the lexicographical descent, since the original
tight set was not balanced, allowing us to find the interior of the optimal facet of the LP.
Theorem 5. Algorithm 4 stops after a finite number of steps. The while loop is executed at most
(n− 1) iterations before finding the nucleolus ν.
Proof. We start by showing the iteration limit of the while loop. Note that rank(Rk) increases in every
iteration as ∅ 6= Tk ⊆ 2N \ span(Rk−1), and since rank(R0) = 1 the algorithm terminates in at most
(n− 1) iterations for the while loop.
Thus, for finite convergence to ν, we only need to show that, within a single iteration, a finite number
of steps from x to (x + αy) is sufficient to reach a T0-balanced tight set, which gets the algorithm out
of the current iteration. For that purpose let us fix that iteration to be k, and for notational ease, for
the remainder of the proof we omit the iteration subscripts k; i.e. T is used in place of Tk, and so on.
According to Lemma 4, as soon as U ∩ T 6= ∅, we reached a T0-balanced tight set U ∩ T itself.
Therefore we suppose that U ∩ T = ∅.
Since T ⊆ 2N \ span(R), the possible tight sets we can encounter is finite, among which there exists
T0-balanced as well, for instance T (ν). Thus, the only way not to reach a T0-balanced tight set is to
encounter an infinite series of tight sets T = (T 1, T 2, . . . , Tm, T 1, Tm+1 . . . ), among which none is T0-
balanced. Here, we use the superscripts to denote the different steps that we encounter under the same
iteration k. Again because of the finitely many tight sets, we guaranteed to revisit at least one tight
set infinitely many times. W.l.o.g., let that one be T 1 and suppose that we first revisit it after taking
m steps. Let us denote the corresponding improving directions, step sizes and maximal dissatisfactions
we encounter at each tight set as (y1,y2, . . . ), (α1, α2, . . . ) and (1, 2, . . . , m, m+1, . . . ), respectively.
Let us suppose that the starting tight set T 1 corresponds to the imputation x1 = x. By Lemma 4
we have 1 > m > m+1 and x +
∑m
j=1 αjyj ∈ I. Thus, we generate improving direction y1 solving the
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LP
min
y
∑
Q∈T 1
y(Q)
s.t. y(Q) ≥ 1, ∀Q ∈ T 1,
y(P) ≥ 0, ∀P ∈ T0,
y(S) = 0, ∀S ∈ R.
(I˜D(T 1))
Note that, here we assume T 1 ∩ U = ∅ and hence we obtain a simpler version of ID(T0;T 1;U).
Since
∑m
j=1 αjyj(S) = 1 − m+1 is constant through S ∈ T 1, β
∑m
j=1 αjyj is feasible in I˜D(T
1)
for large enough β > 0, thus we have
∑m
j=1 αjyj
1−m+1 is optimal in I˜D(T
1). As a result, y1(S) = 1 for all
S ∈ T 1 as y1 is also an optimal solution of I˜D(T 1). Consequently all coalitions remain tight, while
some coalition must join, based on the definition of the step size, hence T 1 ( T 2.
Note that it is not always the case that T 1 is followed by the same T 2. However, since T 2 is pooled
from the finite power set, there must be at least one set T 2 such that the subsequence (T 1, T 2) is
repeated infinitely many times with T 1 ( T 2. Using the same line of arguments, we arrive at longer
repeated subsequences T 1 ( T 2 . . . ( T j for as large j as we wish. This is impossible because the size of
T j is bounded. Thus, the series of tight set T is finite under each iteration. As the number of iterations
is bounded by (n− 1), the algorithm converges in finitely many steps.
Remark 4. We have the following observations by Theorem 5:
• During Algorithm 4, not only in the imputations, but we never circulate in the tight set space
either.
• Note that requiring a finite number of steps is enough to achieve the result claimed above. Numer-
ical experiments indicate that Algorithm 4 executes a very small number of steps, see Subsections
5.1 and 5.2.
Remark 5. The (n − 1) linear programs in Maschler’s scheme [25], the (n − 1) iterations in the
improved Kohlberg criterion for verifying the nucleolus (Algorithm 2), the upper bound of n iterations in
the balancedness checking algorithm (Algorithm 3), and finally the (n−1) iteration in our lexicographical
descent algorithm as stated in Theorem 5 is due to the fact that all of these algorithms are designed to
increase the rank of the collection of tight coalitions considered. While eventually in an implementation
of Maschler’s scheme (e.g. [18]) the same collection of tight coalitions is found as in our lexicographical
descent method, the trajectory how the two different methods reaches this point is different, as evidenced
by the different number of iterations required (cf. Section 5).
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Finally we note that Algorithm 4 can be easily adapted to the case when we have a characterization
set F ⊆ 2N at our disposal, by simply changing the search space in k(x) and Tk(x) from S /∈ span(Rk−1)
to S /∈ (span(Rk−1) ∪ (2N \ F)). The computational bottleneck of Algorithm 4 is performing Step 2
and computing the step size in Step 3. However, given a characterization set F of polynomial size as
an additional input, the algorithm runs in polynomial time. That characterization set is available, if we
restrict our attention, for example to the class of assignment games ([2]), to balanced matching games
([24]), to standard tree games ([26]), among many other classes ([22]).
5 Numerical results
In the following subsections we present numerical results assessing the performance of the algorithms
described above. Both the different versions of Kohlberg algorithms (Algorithms 1, 2 and 5) and the
constructive algorithm (Algorithm 4) have been tested on 4 different types of games, the player set size
ranging from 5 to 30. For games with n ≤ 25, fifty instances were generated from each type, and we
report averages of computational time in seconds, number of iterations, pivot steps and subroutines
(wherever applicable), as well as number of coalitions saved from storage by compact representation
sets. Similarly, for games with n > 25, ten instances were generated from each type. In each category
the corresponding minimal values are highlighted with bold (wherever applicable).
For the sake of completeness the Kohlberg algorithms are tested with 4 solution points including the
nucleolus, a random imputation, a point in the least core and in the least-least core (an element of the
least core with T0-balanced (T1∪T2)). For brevity, we only present here results for the solution being the
nucleolus. Results for the other three solutions are presented in Appendix H. The original and improved
Kohlberg algorithms 1 and 2 are denoted with Kohlberg and IKA respectively, while Algorithm 5 that
includes the compact representation is denoted with IKAcr. The lexicographical descent Algorithm 4
(denoted BFN ) is compared to 4 methods: SP (SD) are the primal (dual) nested LP algorithms due
to Solymosi [17], DK is Derks and Kuipers [19]’s algorithm, while PRA denotes the prolonged simplex
algorithm by [18].
All algorithms were implemented in C++ and computations were carried out on a desktop PC with
Intel Core i5-2500 3.30 GHz CPU and 16 Gb RAM6. All the LPs involved are solved with CPLEX
6In this configuration, the time-efficient implementation of the algorithms run out of memory at n = 28 while processing
initialization, therefore we used a memory-efficient implementation instead for n > 28.
26
12.7.1’s primal simplex method (with default settings7). Time limitations were set with 12 hours for
n ≤ 25, 15 hours for n ≤ 28, and 18 hours for n > 28. All of the codes (along with the test instances)
used to produce these results are available for free access at the GitHub repository [21].
5.1 Type I and II games
Type I and II games both appear in [18] and [27]. The characteristic function for type I is given by
v({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N , v(N ) is a random integer between 100(n−2) and 100n, while v(S) is a random
integer between 1 and 100|S| for all other (non-empty) coalitions S. Type II games are generated as
v({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N and v(S) is a random integer between 1 and 50n for all other (non-empty)
coalitions S.
Table 1: Original and Improved Kohlberg algorithms on type I games and nucleolus solution
n Time Iterations Subroutines Repr.
Kohlberg IKA IKAcr Kohlberg IKA IKAcr Kohlberg IKA IKAcr IKAcr
5 0.014 0.0016 0.0014 25.6 2.6 2.6 43.3 3.3 2.6 2.6
10 2.5 0.0034 0.0042 964.1 2.3 2.3 1279.8 3 2.3 2.4
15 OoT 0.068 0.068 OoT 1.9 1.9 OoT 2.5 1.9 1.9
20 - 3.3 3.2 - 1.7 1.7 - 1.9 1.7 1.8
25 - 161 159 - 1.9 1.9 - 2.4 1.9 1.9
26 - 257 250 - 1.6 1.6 - 1.7 1.6 1.6
27 - 650 631 - 1.9 1.9 - 2.4 1.9 1.9
28 - 2827 2591 - 1.9 1.9 - 2.2 1.9 1.9
29 - 2087 2145 - 1.7 1.7 - 2 1.7 1.7
30 - 3248 3323 - 1.4 1.4 - 1.7 1.4 72842.4
In terms of the verifying Kohlberg algorithms we can start with the general observation that the
classical Kohlberg algorithm is only usable up to a limited size. From Tables 1, 2, 5 and 6 we find that
games of size n = 15 provide already a challenge that Algorithm 1 can not tackle, as it runs out of time.
For the remaining two algorithms IKA and IKAcr, the differences in performance do not seem to be
significant. The advantage of having a compact representation only affects a small number of coalitions
most of the time, with the notable exception of one type I game with 30 players. This is a random game
with quite substantially larger tight set T1(x) than the other games considered. However, as both IKA
7In the case of SP and SD, the average number of pivots reflect the values of CPLEX parameter iterations reported
in the output. In order to obtain realistic pivot numbers, preprocessing was turned off (which did not change the overall
computation time significantly).
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Table 2: Original and Improved Kohlberg algorithms on type II games and nucleolus solution
n Time Iterations Subroutines Repr.
Kohlberg IKA IKAcr Kohlberg IKA IKAcr Kohlberg IKA IKAcr IKAcr
5 0.014 0.0016 0.0016 26.1 2.8 2.6 48.3 3.9 2.6 1.6
10 6.9 0.0033 0.0036 951 2.6 2.5 2023.5 3.6 2.6 2.1
15 OoT 0.11 0.11 OoT 2.5 2.5 OoT 3.6 2.6 2.3
20 - 5.3 5.2 - 2.5 2.5 - 3.4 2.5 2.5
25 - 295 289 - 3.6 3.6 - 5.8 3.6 3.6
26 - 576 558 - 3.1 3.1 - 3.8 3.1 3.1
27 - 1061 1041 - 3 3 - 4.2 3.1 3.1
28 - 5672 5271 - 4.8 4.8 - 7.9 4.8 4.9
29 - 7253 7547 - 4.4 4.4 - 7.3 4.4 4.4
30 - 12766 13325 - 3.8 3.8 - 5 3.8 3.9
and IKAcr terminate after performing only 1 iteration, the advantage of a compact representation is
not realised during any subsequent iterations. On the contrary, the small additional workload necessary
for finding this compact representation appears to provide a slight disadvantage in computation time.
Table 3: Computing the nucleolus of type I games
n Time Iterations Pivots Subrout.
BFN DK SP SD PRA BFN DK SP SD PRA BFN DK SP SD PRA BFN SP
10 0.011 0.014 0.009 0.016 0.11 2.02 2.04 2.02 2.06 2.06 11.8 14.1 55.6 63.6 41 14.3 3.1
15 0.1 0.17 0.42 0.17 370 1.5 1.52 1.5 1.52 1.52 19.2 25.9 93.6 153 161 21 2
20 4.4 7.69 22.1 8.43 OoM 1.46 1.46 1.46 1.46 OoM 28.9 40.6 159 330 OoM 31.4 1.9
25 227 425 OoM OoT - 1.78 1.8 OoM OoT - 42.1 56.5 OoM OoT - 47.6 OoM
26 463 958 - - - 1.6 1.6 - - - 40.6 71.8 - - - 43.3 -
27 1261 2047 - - - 1.9 1.9 - - - 57.1 70.4 - - - 69 -
28 4406 6421 - - - 1.9 1.9 - - - 48.5 82.1 - - - 53.7 -
29 12220 17796 - - - 1.7 1.7 - - - 58.1 78 - - - 66.4 -
30 19232 OoT - - - 1.4 OoT - - - 44.4 OoT - - - 47.4 -
Turning to constructive algorithms, we can start with a general observation similar to the one made
on verification algorithms. Considering the results presented in Table 3 and 4, one finds that classical
sequential LP formulations can not solve games with n = 25 players or more; while SP runs out of
memory, SD does not finish within reasonable time restrictions. It is of little surprise, considering that
these methods handle exponential sized (either in rows or columns) LPs. As impressive the prolonged
simplex method by [18] is, it suffers more having exponential number of both rows and columns, thus
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Table 4: Computing the nucleolus of type II games
n Time Iterations Pivots Subrout.
BFN DK SP SD PRA BNF DK SP SD PRA BFN DK SP SD PRA BFN SP
10 0.01 0.013 0.012 0.007 0.066 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.72 11 14.3 44.2 50.1 22.7 13.8 4
15 0.13 0.18 0.62 0.29 246 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.72 21.6 21 116 103 106 26.4 4
20 5.06 9.05 38 15 OoM 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 OoM 34.1 34 257 198 OoM 42.5 4
25 294 611 OoM OoT - 3.6 3.6 OoM OoT - 53.2 69 OoM OoT - 69.6 OoM
26 524 1155 - - - 3.1 3.1 - - - 42.7 65.6 - - - 49 -
27 1167 2322 - - - 3 3.1 - - - 52.3 69.1 - - - 66.3 -
28 5222 7846 - - - 4.8 4.8 - - - 58.3 61.7 - - - 77.6 -
29 14624 21429 - - - 4.4 4.4 - - - 69.7 78.3 - - - 96.7 -
30 29593 OoT - - - 3.8 OoT - - - 68.1 OoT - - - 90.7 -
running out of memory already at 20 players. This is the case for all types of games considered, as
Tables 7 and 8 also confirm.
Regarding the number of iterations needed, we see from Table 3 and 4 that type I and II games
barely distinguish between primal (BFN, SP) and dual methods (DK, SD, PRA), the latter requiring at
least as many iterations as the former, by nature. Even though the main advantage of primal methods,
i. e. having a smaller number of iterations, is barely realised in these types of games, BFN still produces
the best computing times, outperforming DK for every size of games, while the latter becomes unusable
at n = 30. Furthermore, while BFN requires less pivots at the price of invoking subroutine Algorithm
3, this seems to be rarely rewarded with fewer number of iterations, at least for type I and II games.
5.2 Type III and IV games
Derks and Kuipers [19] were interested in games where the number of iterations grows more or less
linearly with the number of players, and so they introduced type III games as v(S) = 0 for all |S| < n−2,
v(S) = 1 with probability 0.9 for n − 2 ≤ |S| < n and v(N ) = 1. According to Table 7 the authors
were obviously successful in terms of generating games where their (dual) method struggles, whereas
for primal methods these games can be considered as trivial. As a result, it is no wonder that the
computation times of DK are magnitudes higher compared to those of BFN.
In order to test the methods on games, which distinguish between the number of iterations required
by primal and dual methods more realistically, that is games that are ‘somewhere between types I-II
and III’, we introduce type IV games as v({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N and v(S) is a random integer between
1 and n for all other (non-empty) coalitions S.
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Table 5: Original and Improved Kohlberg algorithms on type III games and nucleolus solution
n Time Iterations Subroutines Repr.
Kohlberg IKA IKAcr Kohlberg IKA IKAcr Kohlberg IKA IKAcr IKAcr
5 0.0021 0.0006 0.0011 5.2 1 1 6.1 2.0 2.0 5.0
10 0.43 0.0012 0.0028 10.7 1 1 12.7 2.6 2.9 30.2
15 OoT 0.026 0.026 OoT 1 1 OoT 2.2 2.5 80.9
20 - 1.00 1.0 - 1 1 - 2 2.7 152.2
25 - 38.7 39.7 - 1 1 - 2.1 2.9 245.2
26 - 81.8 81.6 - 1 1 - 2.2 2.6 270.3
27 - 168 170 - 1 1 - 2.3 2.7 291.5
28 - 1092 1076 - 1 1 - 2.2 2.6 315.7
29 - 217 226 - 1 1 - 2.2 2.7 336.0
30 - 447 449 - 1 1 - 2.2 2.8 358.5
Table 6: Original and Improved Kohlberg algorithms on type IV games and nucleolus solution
n Time Iterations Subroutines Repr.
Kohlberg IKA IKAcr Kohlberg IKA IKAcr Kohlberg IKA IKAcr IKAcr
5 0.010 0.0009 0.0009 14.2 1.6 1.6 24.5 2.6 1.8 2.8
10 2.2 0.0027 0.0028 285 2 2 608 3.4 2.4 3.7
15 OoT 0.079 0.079 OoT 2 2 OoT 3.6 2.8 9.4
20 - 3.7 3.6 - 2.1 2.1 - 4.3 4 18.6
25 - 220 225 - 2.9 2.9 - 6.1 3.9 15.6
26 - 590 573 - 3.4 3.4 - 6.2 5 16.1
27 - 1305 1269 - 3.6 3.6 - 7.1 4.7 18.1
28 - 4576 4344 - 3.7 3.7 - 7.4 5.1 18.2
29 - 5464 5658 - 3.5 3.5 - 7.2 5.4 25.2
30 - 9647 9842 - 2.8 2.8 - 5.9 4.4 29.1
Both IKA and IKAcr solve type III games extremely easily, making them hard to compare with
each other8. Their performance for type IV games show a similar behaviour as games of types I and II.
Tables 7 and 8 show that as soon as the required number of iterations at least moderately distin-
guishes between primal and dual methods, the difference in computational time between BFN and DK
greatly increases.
8The non-monotonicity in computation time occurring between 28- and 29-player games are due to the two types of
implementations, a so-called time-efficient and memory-efficient version. The time-efficient implementation is actually not
efficient in terms of computational time, as it wastes time at initialization compared to the memory-efficient version.
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Table 7: Computing the nucleolus of type III games
n Time Iterations Pivots Subrout.
BFN DK SP SD PRA BFN DK SP SD PRA BFN DK SP SD PRA BFN SP
10 0.001 0.051 0.003 0.007 0.099 1 5.8 1 2.9 5.72 0 52.1 15.5 55.7 28.5 3.1 2.6
15 0.007 0.73 0.18 0.25 164 1 6.7 1 2.6 6.22 0 110 23.5 102 61.4 3.9 2.4
20 0.18 47.6 8.44 15.2 OoM 1 11 1 3 OoM 0 234 33.8 933 OoM 3.8 2.8
25 6.48 2571 OoM OoT - 1 11.6 OoM OoT - 0 348 OoM OoT - 4.7 OoM
26 13.6 5705 - - - 1 13.5 - - - 0 385 - - - 5.1 -
27 29.1 12208 - - - 1 12.6 - - - 0 408 - - - 5.2 -
28 729 29867 - - - 1 14.7 - - - 0 471 - - - 5.4 -
29 120 OoT - - - 1 OoT - - - 0 OoT - - - 6 -
30 239 - - - - 1 - - - - 0 - - - - 6 -
Table 8: Computing the nucleolus of type IV games
n Time Iterations Pivots Subrout.
BFN DK SP SD PRA BFN DK SP SD PRA BFN DK SP SD PRA BFN SP
10 0.007 0.014 0.008 0.007 0.054 2 2.5 2 2.5 2.62 6.6 15.1 33.5 42.4 18.4 9.3 3.3
15 0.05 0.2 0.36 0.27 122 2 2.9 2 2.5 2.72 8.9 27.4 71.1 95.7 106 12.1 3.6
20 2.17 11.4 20.7 19.1 OoM 2.1 4.2 2.1 3.4 OoM 10.8 44.4 130 223 OoM 15.2 4.5
25 102 563 OoM OoT - 2.9 4.2 OoM OoT - 16.8 69.3 OoM OoT - 23.1 OoM
26 188 1375 - - - 3.4 5.2 - - - 16.4 70.5 - - - 22.6 -
27 486 3024 - - - 3.6 5.4 - - - 19.7 78.3 - - - 31 -
28 3128 9648 - - - 3.7 6 - - - 19.3 106 - - - 26.3 -
29 4665 22760 - - - 3.5 6.1 - - - 21.3 89 - - - 32.1 -
30 8550 OoT - - - 2.8 OoT - - - 18.9 OoT - - - 25.4 -
5.3 Limitations of our algorithm
We now study the bottleneck of the lexicographical descent algorithm in attempt to find games that
our proposed method struggles with. The performance of Algorithm 3 as the balancedness subroutine
of Algorithm 4 depends on the size of the tight set, so we now look for games with extremely large tight
sets. From a verification point of view we expect that the compact representation of tight sets carries an
improvement in these games, therefore also providing significant distinguishment between Algorithms
2 and 5.
For our purposes we adopt the United Nations (UN) Security Council voting mechanism into
weighted voting games with arbitrary size, where there are 5 big (veto) players and the rest (origi-
nally 10) are small. Formal description and results for the verification algorithms can be found in
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Appendix H.3.
Our attempts to find a game our method struggles with were somewhat successful, meaning that
while we have a sizeable advantage in computation time over other algorithms for n ≤ 26, this advantage
vanishes at n = 27, until eventually BFN runs out of memory for n = 28. This is due to the fact that
these games have extremely large tight sets, which severely affects BFN through Algorithm 3 with a
very large |T | of exponential size, while by the nature of [19]’s method this does not affect DK.
It should be noted that finding the nucleolus of these games is trivial, i.e. one can easily find
analytically that the 5 veto players share the total payoff of 1 amongst themselves in an egalitarian way,
while all the small players get 0. Therefore anyone interested in finding the nucleolus of such a game
would never turn to any of the aforementioned algorithms. Instead, since these games are of a very
peculiar nature from an algorithmic perspective, they carry a theoretical interest from a computational
point of view. For games with structures like this, we expect further improvement by exploiting the
structure in a similar way to [20]. However, within the scope of this paper, we want to provide a
like-for-like comparison and hence leave further improvements for future research.
5.4 Comparing Kohlberg algorithms on different solutions
Finally, we consider further numerical tests of the various Kohlberg algorithms (Algorithms 1, 2 and 5)
that verify whether a particular solution of a game is the nucleolus or not. We test these algorithms
on four kinds of solutions: a random imputation, an element each of the least core and the least-least
core (i.e. T1 ∪ T2 is T0-balanced), and the nucleolus. Results for the latter were presented above in
Sections 5.1-5.2, while we cover the former three in Appendix H.
Naturally, our expectations are that random imputations are probably in no relation with the nucle-
olus, therefore should be rejected straight away, while as we ‘go deeper’ into the least core, more effort
is needed to reject solutions that are not the nucleoli themselves.
As a general observation, our first expectation is met, regardless of the type of the game. Tables 9,
10, 15, 16 and 19 show that all of the algorithms reject random solutions without any significant effort
(and therefore we omit these cases from further analysis). Our other expectations seem to be met as
well, as we clearly notice increases in time, iterations and subroutine calls when moving towards more
involved solutions.
Another observation is that the original Kohlberg algorithm is again not able to solve instances with
more than 10 players as soon as we consider a solution from the least core, or more than 15 players
and the least-least core in case of the UN Security Council game cf. Tables 20-21. Thus, as before,
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algorithms IKA and IKAcr provide the only option for most games and the solutions to be verified.
Hence, in our further analysis we again restrict ourselves to comparing these two algorithms, with the
details provided in Appendix H.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we present both an Improved algorithmic approach for verifying whether a payoff vector
is the nucleolus and a novel constructive method for finding it. In the first part, we develop an Improved
Kohlberg criterion in which the number of iterations is bounded by at most (n− 1) instead of possibly
exponentially large in the original Kohlberg criterion. This also comes with introducing representative
sets for more efficient storage of the coalitions and a faster algorithm for checking balancedness. In
the second part, we develop a novel descent-based algorithm for computing the nucleolus that exploits
the new and Improved Kohlberg criterion. We compare the performance of our new algorithms with
existing methods and demonstrate their effectiveness through numerical testing with a number of games
proposed in the literature. Finally, we provide our algorithms, as well as the relevant literature’s in an
online open-source code repository, which we believe is an important step forward, that the cooperative
game theory community can build upon.
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A Geometric view of the nucleolus
Let us recall the simple three-player cooperative game of Example 1.
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Example 1. Consider the 3-player game v with coalition values v({1}) = 1, v({2}) = 2, v({3}) = 5,
v({1, 2}) = 6, v({1, 3}) = 7, v({2, 3}) = 8, and v(N ) = 12. The set of all imputations is I =
{(x1, x2, x3) : x1 + x2 + x3 = 12, x1 ≥ 1, x2 ≥ 2, x3 ≥ 5}, while the core of the game is
Co = {(x1, x2, x3) : x1 + x2 + x3 = 12, x1 ≥ 1, x2 ≥ 2, x3 ≥ 5,
x1 + x2 ≥ 6, x1 + x3 ≥ 7, x2 + x3 ≥ 8}.
The least core is the line segment connecting x = (2, 4.5, 5.5) and y = (3.5, 3, 5.5). The nucleolus is
ν = (2.75, 3.75, 5.5).
Following the footsteps of Maschler et al. [15], one can formulate the following geometric property
of the nucleolus. For the purpose of convenient visualisation, let us consider the game in Example 1,
which has a non-empty core. Then from any point x within the core of the game, the distances to the
hyperplanes forming the core are the levels of satisfactions the corresponding coalitions have over the
proposed outcome x. The least core are those points in the core that minimize the maximum level of
dissatisfaction, or equivalently, maximize the minimum level of satisfaction. The least core, therefore,
contains the centre of the largest balls that we can fit into the core. The corresponding largest radius
corresponds to the minimum level of satisfaction.
This geometrical property is captured on Figure 3, where the outcome space x ∈ R3 is projected
to the hyperplane x(N ) = v(N ), thereby the image is in a 2-dimensional space. In Figure 3a, the 2D
grey trapezoid is the projected core, and we find that we cannot increase the ball fitted into it around
the point of the nucleolus because of the two parallel tight constraints. This ball corresponds to the
largest ball fitting into the core in the original outcome space, and the tight constraints that avoid the
ball from getting larger form a set of ‘balanced’ coalitions, a concept formally defined in Section 2.1.
Among the least core outcomes, we want to minimize the second level of maximal dissatisfaction.
This is equivalent to finding the largest ball within the new (and larger) polytope that is derived from the
core after having removed a balanced set of tight constraints found in the previous step. If we repeat this
process, we will finally arrive at the point that lexicographically minimizes the dissatisfactions among
all the coalitions. That is precisely the nucleolus.
In the example, if we relax the tight core constraints that are limiting the size of the ball in the
first iteration, then we arrive at a new projected polytope as shown in Figure 3b. At this point, if we
consider only the balls whose center belongs to the least core, the center of the largest one among these
is the nucleolus.
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(a) Starting level
(b) Subsequent level
Figure 3: Geometric view of the nucleolus
The problem of finding the largest ball within a polytope can be formulated as a linear program.
Therefore, the nucleolus can be found by successively solving a nested sequence of linear programs. This
is indeed the main underlying framework for the linear programming approach appearing in [15, 16, 17,
18, 19, 20].
To demonstrate the original Kohlberg criterion (Algorithm 1), we consider the simple three-player
cooperative game of Example 1. At the nucleolus ν, we find T0(ν) = ∅, T1(ν) = {{1, 2}, {3}}, T2(ν) =
{{1, 3}, {2, 3}}, 1(ν) = −0.5 and 2(ν) = −1.25. Here, T1(ν) is T0(ν)-balanced with weight vector
ω = (1, 1). Similarly, (T1(ν)∪T2(ν)) is T0(ν)-balanced with weight vector ω = (3/4, 1/2, 1/4, 1/4). This
means (T0(ν), T1(ν), T2(ν)) has property II and hence ν is verified as the nucleolus. We can also verify
that the Kohlberg criterion does not hold for any x′ 6= ν. For example, let x′ = 1/2(x + ν). Then
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T1(x
′) = {{1, 2}}, {3}} and T2(x′) = {{1, 3}}. Although T1(x′) is T0(x′)-balanced, (T1(x′) ∪ T2(x′)) is
not and this verifies that x′ is not the nucleolus.
B Reducing the sizes of the tight sets
When checking the Kohlberg criterion we might end up having to store an exponentially large number
of coalitions. The practical efficiency of checking T0-balancedness depends entirely on the size of the
tight sets we encounter. For these purposes, it is of particular interest to find compact representations
of large tight sets.
First, we provide a method for reducing the size of Hk to at most n(n − 1). This is achieved by
replacing tight sets with their compact representations. We start by showing some further balancedness
properties.
Proposition 1. The following results hold:
(a) If T ⊆ 2N is a nonempty T0-balanced set then there exists R ⊆ T with 1 ≤ |R| = rank(R) ≤
rank(T ) that is T0-balanced.
(b) Let there be nonempty collections P,Q ⊆ 2N with Q∪P being a T0-balanced set. Then there exists
a subset R ⊆ Q with 1 ≤ |R| = rank(R) ≤ rank(Q) such that R ∪ P is T0-balanced.
Proof.
(a) Given that T is T0-balanced, there exists γ ∈ R|T0|≥0 and ω ∈ R|T |>0 such that
e(N ) =
∑
S∈T0
γSe(S) +
∑
S∈T
ωSe(S).
Thus,
0 6= e(N )−
∑
S∈T0
γSe(S) =
∑
S∈T
ωSe(S),
i.e.,
(
e(N )−∑S∈T0 γSe(S)) belongs to the convex combination of {e(S)}S∈T . Applying the
Caratheodory theorem, there exists a subset U ⊆ T with rank(U) = |U | = rank(T ) such that(
e(N )−∑S∈T0 γSe(S)) = ∑S∈U βSe(S). By removing coalitions with coefficient βS = 0, we
obtain a subset R ⊆ U ⊆ T with rank(R) ≤ rank(U) that is T0-balanced. Note also that,
since
(
e(N )−∑S∈T0 γSe(S)) 6= 0, there exists at least one coalition S with βS > 0. Thus,
1 ≤ rank(R) ≤ rank(T ) and R is T0-balanced. In addition, since rank(U) = |U |, we also have
rank(R) = |R|.
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(b) Since Q ∪ P is T0-balanced, there exist γ ∈ R|T0|≥0 , α ∈ R|P |>0 , and η ∈ R|Q|>0 such that e(N ) =∑
S∈T0 γSe(S) +
∑
S∈P αSe(S) +
∑
S∈Q ηSe(S). Thus,
e(N )−
∑
S∈T0
γSe(S)−
∑
S∈P
αSe(S) =
∑
S∈Q
ηSe(S) 6= 0.
Using the same arguments as in part (a), there exists a subset Q′ ⊆ Q with rank(Q′) = |Q′| =
rank(Q) such that
e(N )−
∑
S∈T0
γSe(S)−
∑
S∈P
αSe(S) =
∑
S∈Q′
βSe(S).
By removing those coalitions S ∈ Q′ with βS = 0, we obtain a non-empty subset R ⊆ Q′ such
that R ∪ P is T0-balanced and 1 ≤ |R| = rank(R) ≤ rank(Q).
We denote a subset R as in Proposition 1a as Ra and a subset R as in Proposition 1b as Rb.
Proposition 2. The collection of tight coalitions in Algorithm 2, ∪kj=1Tj can be represented by ∪kj=1Rbj
of size at most n(n− 1).
Proof. Since for each Tj , the set R
b
j can be constructed using Proposition 1b as a subset of another full
row rank subset, its size is at most n. Since the number of iterations involved checking the Kohlberg
criterion is at most (n− 1), the total size of ∪kj=1Rbj is at most n(n− 1).
Note that, in accordance with Remark 2, Proposition 1 does not solve the problem of how to find a
tight set of exponential size. In particular, it does not even touch on how to find a compact representative
of such a tight set. To find such a representation, we need to identify among the exponential many
vertices of a polytope the few relevant ones.
Theorem 6. The while-loop in Algorithm 5 terminates after at most (n− 1) iterations and it correctly
decides whether an imputation is the nucleolus.
The proof of Theorem 6 is provided in Appendix F. Note that after Step 2, when we check the
condition of T0-balancedness, while we write (∪kj=1Tj) being T0-balanced, we can exploit Lemma 3b to
use the representative sets Rk instead when performing the balancedness checking.
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Algorithm 5: Improved Kohlberg Algorithm with Compact Representation.
Input: Game (N , v), imputation x ∈ I;
Output: Conclude if x is the nucleolus or not;
1. Initialization: Set R0 = {N}, T0 = {{i} : xi = v({i}) (i = 1, . . . , n)}, and k = 1;
while |Rk−1| < n do
2. Find Tk = argmax
S6∈span(Rk−1)
{v(S)− x(S)};
if (∪kj=1Tj) is T0-balanced then
3. Set Rk = rep(Tk;Rk−1), k = k + 1 and continue;
else
4. Stop the algorithm and conclude that x is not the nucleolus.
end
end
5. Conclude that x is the nucleolus.
C Geometric view of the lexicographical descent algorithm
Example 1. Let us continue with Example 1 to demonstrate the underlying geometrical intuition behind
Algorithm 4. For readability, in this example we use superscripts to distinguish between different impu-
tations, while subscripts of maximum dissatisfaction levels k and tight sets Tk are used to keep track of
iterations. Figure 4 summarises the game and the solution approach in the (x1, x2) preimputation space,
where x3 = v(N ) − x1 − x2. The dotted lines show the coalitional rationality constraints and the gray
trapezoid is the projection of the core Co of the game onto the (x1, x2) space. We are using Algorithm
4 to find the nucleolus of ν from a starting imputation x0 = [1, 4, 7].
The underlying geometrical intuition can be easily followed through by considering Figure 5, which
represents a magnified part of Figure 4. First, we find that our distance to the boundary of the core is
1, hence 1(x
0) = 1. We also find that currently the largest infeasibility among core inequalities belongs
to constraint x1 + x2 ≥ 6. Therefore, T1(x0) = {{1, 2}}, while T0(x0) = {{1}} because x01 = v({1}). It
is easy to see that the current tight set T1(x
0) is not T0(x
0)-balanced. In geometrical terms this means
there are nearby points having smaller distance to the boundary of the core. In the algorithm we run
into an infeasible system when checking the balancedness, so we can find improving directions by solving
ID(T1(x
0);T0(x
0);N ). As an example, y = [−1, 0, 1] is an improving direction depicted with an arrow
from the current point x0. Moving along this direction we can decrease the radius of the Euclidean ball
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x2
x1
x2 ≥ 2
x1 ≥ 1
x1 + x3 ≥ 7
x2 + x3 ≥ 8
x1 + x2 ≥ 6
x3 ≥ 5
x01(x
0) = 1
Figure 4: Hyperplane of preimputations: x1 + x2 + x3 = v(N ) = 12
touching the boundary of the core.
Notice that here we measure the distance from the boundary with a special signed distance; in the
interior of the core the distance from the boundary is understood to be negative. Thus, we can move
even further along the direction after reaching the core, until eventually we can not decrease the radius
of the ball touching the boundary of the core any more. This happens precisely when the distances from
both constraints (x3 ≥ 5) and (x1 + x2 ≥ 6) are −0.5, that is when x1 = [2.5, 4, 5.5], 1(x1) = −0.5,
T1(x
1) = {{1, 2}, {3}} and T0(x1) = ∅. This corresponds to a pivot step in a simplex-like algorithm,
where coalition {3} enters the basis. In accordance with (14), the step size chosen in direction y is
α = 1.5. After this step, we find that T1(x
1) is T0(x
1)-balanced, therefore we expand R0 with an
arbitrary element of T1(x
1) as rank(R0 ∪ T1(x1)) = 2. By doing so we lift those inequality constraints
that made it impossible to decrease the radius of the ball further; that is throughout the remaining
execution of the algorithm those constraints remain satisfied with equality at the current largest excess
level of 1(x
1) = −0.5.
The set of imputations having the coalitions in T1(x
1) being tight at 1 = −0.5 actually form the
least core LC of the game, depicted by the thick black line in Figure 6. The dashed line shows that, at
the current point x1, among constraints not in span(R1), we are closest to violating x1 + x3 ≥ 7 with
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x2 ≥ 2
x1 ≥ 1
x1 + x3 ≥ 7
x2 + x3 ≥ 8
x1 + x2 ≥ 6
x3 ≥ 5
x0
x1
1 = 1→ −0.5
Figure 5: Pivot step
2(x
1) = −1. Further, we have that T0 remains empty at x1 and the tight set T2(x1) = {{1, 3}} is not
T0-balanced, so we find an improving direction parallel to the set of least core outcomes. That is, the
unique solution of ID(T2(x
1);T0;R1) is y = [1,−1, 0], and we can take a step size of α = 1/4 until
coalition {2, 3} becomes tight as well. The resulting point is x2 = [2.75, 3.75, 5.5]> with largest excess
2(x
2) = −1.25, T0 = ∅ and tight set T2(x2) = {{1, 3}, {2, 3}}. Since T1(x2)∪T2(x2) is T0-balanced and
rank(R1 ∪ T2(x2)) = n we found the nucleolus ν = x2.
D Alternative Proof of Kohlberg Criterion
Let (T0, T ) be two collections of coalitions. For each coalition C ∈ T , let us the define of the primal
max
γ,ω,α
ωC
s.t.
∑
S∈T0
γSe(S) +
∑
S∈T
ωSe(S)− αe(N ) = 0,
γ ≥ 0, ω ≥ 0,
(P˜ (C))
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x2 ≥ 2
x1 ≥ 1
x1 + x3 ≥ 7
x2 + x3 ≥ 8
2 = −1→ −1.25
x1
x2
Figure 6: Pivot step
and the corresponding dual problem
miny 0
s.t. y>e(S) ≥ 0, ∀S ∈ T0 ∪ T,
y>e(N ) = 0,
y>e(C) ≥ 1.
(D˜(C))
We have the following results:
Lemma 5. For any given pair of subsets (T0, T ) of the power set 2
N , the followings are equivalent
(a) T is T0-balanced if any only if for all C ∈ T , the primal problem (P˜ (C)) is unbounded.
(b) For any C ∈ T , the primal problem (P˜ (C)) is unbounded if any only if the dual (D˜(C)) is infeasible.
(c) The dual problem (D˜(C)) is infeasible for all C ∈ T if any only if (T0, T ) has property I.
(d) (T0, T ) has property II if and only if T is T0-balanced.
Proof. Result in part (d) is what we want to show and this will follows directly if we are able to
show (a)-(c). We choose to show both sides of the if and only if statements in part (a)-(c) so that each
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of these can be viewed as stand-alone results even though the proof of the entire lemma only requires
one direction such as (a)⇒(b)⇒(c)⇒(d)⇒(a).
(a) ⇒ If T is T0-balanced, there exists weight vectors γ ∈ R|T0|≥0 ,ω ∈ R|T |>0 such that∑
S∈T0
γSe(S) +
∑
S∈T
ωSe(S) = e(N ).
For each C ∈ T , we have (γ, ω, 1) is a feasible solution to (P˜ (C)) with an objective value of ωC > 0.
Since the problem is homogeneous on (γ, ω, α), that is for all ∆ > 0, we have (∆γ,∆ω,∆α) is also
a feasible solution with an optimal value of ∆ωC , the primal problem is unbounded and hence the
dual problem (P˜ (C)) is infeasible.
⇐ For each C ∈ T , given that the primal problem (P˜ (C)) is unbounded, we can pick a correspond-
ing feasible solution (γ, ω, 1) with a positive objective value ωC . Average out all such feasible
solutions (γ, ω, 1), one for each C ∈ T , we would obtain the average weight (γ¯, ω¯) that satisfies
γ¯ ≥ 0, ω¯ > 0, and ∑
S∈T0
γ¯Se(S) +
∑
S∈T
ω¯Se(S) = e(N )
Thus, T is T0-balanced.
(b) We can see that the primal problem is always feasible at (γ = 0, ω = 0, α = 0). In addition, the
problem is homogeneous on (γ, ω, α) and hence its optimal value is either zero or it is unbounded.
The dual problem, on the other hand, is either infeasible or has an optimal value zero. From linear
programming duality results, it is easy to show that in this case, the primal is unbounded if and
only if the dual is infeasible.
(c) ⇐ If (T0, T ) has property I, we have (D˜(C)) infeasible for all C ∈ T by definition of property I.
⇒ If (D˜(C)) infeasible for all C ∈ T then (T0, T ) must have property I since otherwise there exists
a y ∈ Y (T0 ∪ T ) and a coalition C ∈ T such that y(C) > 0. Thus, we can scale up y by an
appropriate factor ∆ such that ∆y ∈ Y (T0 ∪ T ) and ∆y(C) ≥ 1. This means the dual problem
(D˜(C)) is feasible. Contradiction!
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E Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. (a) Given that T is T0-balanced, there exists γ ∈ R|T0|≥0 and ω ∈ R|T |>0 such that
e(N ) =
∑
S∈T0
γSe(S) +
∑
S∈T
ωSe(S).
For any S0 ∈ span(T ), there exists β such that e(S0) =
∑
S∈T βSe(S). Thus, for any δ, we have
e(N ) =
∑
S∈T0
γSe(S) +
∑
S∈T
ωSe(S)
=
∑
S∈T0
γSe(S) +
∑
S∈T
ωSe(S) + δ(e(S0)−
∑
S∈T
βSe(S))
=
∑
S∈T0
γSe(S) + δe(S0) +
∑
S∈T
(ωS − δβS)e(S).
Since ω > 0, we can choose δ > 0 which is small enough such that (ωS − δβS) > 0, ∀S ∈ T . Thus,
T ∪{S0} is a T0-balanced collection. Since this holds for all S0 ∈ span(T ), we can conclude that span(T )
is T0-balanced.
(b) Given that collections U, V are T0-balanced, there exists γ, ω ∈ R|T0|≥0 and α ∈ R|U |>0 , β ∈ R|V |>0
such that
e(N ) =
∑
S∈T0
γSe(S) +
∑
S∈U
αSe(S) =
∑
S∈T0
ωSe(S) +
∑
S∈V
βSe(S).
This leads to
e(N ) =
∑
S∈T0
(1/2γS + 1/2ωS)e(S) +
∑
S∈U
1/2αSe(S) +
∑
S∈V
1/2βSe(S).
Thus, U ∪ V is also T0-balanced. We can also prove that span(U)∪ span(V ) is T0-balanced in a similar
way as shown in the proof of part (a).
(c) The proof is similar to part (a) due to the fact that, for any S0 ∈ span(U) ∩ V , we have
S0 ∈ span(U) and hence U ∪ S0 is also T0-balanced. Thus, span(U) ∩ V is T0-balanced.
F Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. After each iteration, we have Tk 6⊆ span(Rk−1) = span(Hk−1) and rank(Rk) ≥ 1 by its con-
struction. Therefore rank(Rk) = rank(Tk ∪Hk−1) keeps increasing. Thus, Algorithm 5 terminates after
at most (n − 1) iterations. We also note that the algorithm terminates at either Step 4 or 5 with
complementary conclusions.
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Proving that the algorithm correctly decides whether an imputation is the nucleolus is equivalent to
showing that (a) if x is the nucleolus then the algorithm terminates at Step 5, and (b) if the algorithm
terminates at Step 5, then the input payoff vector must be the nucleolus.
The proof for part (a) is still the same as that proof for Theorem 2 since the key property used
in that proof was to preserve the T0-balancedness of Hk. The analogy to Theorem 6 is that Rk is
always T0-balanced throughout the algorithm according to Lemma 3b. If x is the nucleolus then T1 is
T0-balanced and the algorithm gets through to Step 3 at k = 1. Suppose, for the purpose of deriving
a contradiction, that the algorithm terminates at Step 4 at some index k > 1 with (Rk−1 ∪ Tk) not
T0-balanced while Rk−1 is T0-balanced by the construction in Step 3 of the previous iteration. Then,
by Lemma 1, there exists y ∈ Rn such that
y(S) ≥ 0,∀S ∈ T0 ∪Rk−1 ∪ Tk; y(N ) = 0; y(S ′) > 0, for some S ′ ∈ Tk.
Thus,
Φspan(Rk−1)∪Tk(x + y) <L Φspan(Rk−1)∪Tk(x).
In addition, for all S 6∈ (span(Rk−1) ∪ Tk) we have v(S)− x(S) < k by the construction in Step 2.
Thus, there exist δ > 0, which is small enough such that
v(S)− (x + δy)(S) < k, ∀S 6∈ (span(Rk−1) ∪ Tk)
and
Φspan(Rk−1)∪Tk(x + δy) <L Φspan(Rk−1)∪Tk(x).
In other words, the | span(Rk−1)∪Tk| largest excess value of x is lexicographically larger than the excess
values of (x + δy) on these collections of coalitions. As a result, Φ(x) is lexicographically larger than
Φ(x + δy) considering all coalitions, which means x is not the nucleolus. Contradiction!
The proof for part (b) is also the same as that in Theorem 2 where the key property of retaining
rank(Hk) = rank(Rk) increased throughout the algorithm is still preserved. Due to the T0-balancedness
of (Rk−1∪Tk), we can use Lemma 1 to recursively show that (z−x)(S) = 0 for all S ∈ Rk−1∪Tk where
z is the nucleolus as follows.
Let y = z−x. We have y(N ) = 0 and y(S) ≥ 0, ∀S ∈ T0 due to the fact that z is an imputation and
also by the definition of T0. We also have y(S) ≥ 0,∀S ∈ R1 due to the fact that ΦR1(z) ≤L ΦR1(x).
Applying the result from Lemma 1 with a note that R1 is T0-balanced, we have y(S) = 0,∀S ∈ R1
which means z and x are lexicographically equivalent on R1. We will prove by induction that y(S) =
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0,∀S ∈ Rk for all indices k. Suppose this indeed holds for (k − 1), i.e. y(S) = 0, ∀S ∈ Rk−1. In
other words, z and x are lexicographically equivalent on Rk−1 which spans the collection of coalitions
from which x receives the worst excess values. In order for z to be lexicographically at least as good
as x, the excess values of z on those coalitions in Rk must be no worse than those from x, i.e., y(S) ≥
0,∀S ∈ Rk. Applying the result from Lemma 1 with a note that Rk is T0-balanced, we must also have
y(S) = 0,∀S ∈ Rk; that is (x− z)(S) = 0,∀S ∈ Rk. Since rank(Rk−1) = n, we have x = z.
G Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Part (a): if T is T0-balanced then obviously (7) is feasible with µ = 0. Now suppose that (7) is
satisfied with some weights γ ∈ R|T0|≥0 , ω ∈ R|T |>0, µ ∈ R. First observe that µ < 1 since ω > 0 and γ ≥ 0.
Thus, ∑
S∈T0
γS
1− µe(S) +
∑
S∈T
ωS
1− µe(S) = e(N ),
and hence T is T0-balanced.
Part (b): if T is T0-balanced then obviously (8) is feasible with µ > 0. Now suppose ∃γ ∈ R|T0|≥0 , ω ∈
R|T\Q|>0 , µ ∈ R|Q| satisfying (8). Since Q is T0-balanced,∑
S∈T0
αSe(S) +
∑
S∈Q
βSe(S) = e(N ). (15)
with α ≥ 0 and β > 0. Choose δ > 0 large enough such that µS + δβS > 0 for all S ∈ Q. Then (8) and
(15) lead to ∑
S∈T0
γS + δαS
δ + 1
e(S) +
∑
S∈T\Q
ωS
δ + 1
e(S) +
∑
S∈Q
µS + δβS
δ + 1
e(S) = e(N )
showing that T is indeed T0-balanced.
H Numerical results for the Kohlberg algorithms
As we mentioned in Section H, in the followings we focus our attention to the performance of the
various Kohlberg algorithms (Kohlberg, IKA and IKAcr) on payoff vectors randomly chosen from the
imputations set, the least core, and the so-called least-least core (with T1 ∪T2 being T0-balanced). Also
as we mentioned, rejecting a random imputation being trivial, and the original Kohlberg algorithm
unusable even for moderate sized games (n ≥ 15), when analysing the results we compare IKA and
IKAcr on the remaining two outcomes. The notation is in line with Section H.
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H.1 Type I and II games
Table 9: Original and Improved Kohlberg algorithms on type I games and random imputation
n Time Iterations Subroutines Repr.
Kohlberg IKA IKAcr Kohlberg IKA IKAcr Kohlberg IKA IKAcr IKAcr
5 0.0006 0.0006 0.0004 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
10 0.022 0.0011 0.0009 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
15 0.024 0.023 0.023 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
20 0.94 0.92 0.95 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
25 36.6 36 36.7 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
26 75.7 76 76 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
27 158 157 158 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
28 754 755 746 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
29 122 110 107 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
30 472 454 446 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
Table 10: Original and Improved Kohlberg algorithms on type II games and random imputation
n Time Iterations Subroutines Repr.
Kohlberg IKA IKAcr Kohlberg IKA IKAcr Kohlberg IKA IKAcr IKAcr
5 0.0006 0.0003 0.0001 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
10 0.0018 0.0009 0.0007 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
15 0.024 0.023 0.023 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
20 0.95 0.92 0.93 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
25 36.6 36 36.9 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
26 75.4 76.3 75.8 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
27 158 157 158 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
28 728 777 752 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
29 113 108 108 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
30 456 492 464 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
We observe that other outcomes from the least core greatly resemble what we have noticed in Tables
1 and 2 with the nucleolus. As the number of iterations are the same for IKA and IKAcr, since there is
only a slight edge in the number of subroutines for IKAcr in type I games, we can note that IKAcr is
still faster in most of the cases (especially for the least core), but the difference is not very significant.
Even though the slightest of difference between IKA and IKAcr in iterations appears for type II
games, we observe practically the same regardless of outcomes from the least or the least-least core.
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Table 11: Original and Improved Kohlberg algorithms on type I games and least core payoff
n Time Iterations Subroutines Repr.
Kohlberg IKA IKAcr Kohlberg IKA IKAcr Kohlberg IKA IKAcr IKAcr
5 0.012 0.0013 0.0011 6.9 1.8 1.8 12.2 2.6 2.0 1.2
10 1.3 0.0026 0.003 385.6 1.8 1.8 527.8 2.5 1.8 1.2
15 OoT 0.052 0.052 OoT 1.6 1.6 OoT 2.2 1.6 1
20 - 2.9 2.9 - 1.6 1.6 - 2.3 1.7 1.1
25 - 124 124 - 1.6 1.6 - 2.3 1.8 1.3
26 - 235 228 - 1.5 1.5 - 1.9 1.5 1.2
27 - 500 487 - 1.6 1.6 - 2.1 1.6 1.1
28 - 2459 2289 - 1.7 1.7 - 2.2 1.7 1.2
29 - 543 529 - 1.1 1.1 - 1.5 1.4 1
30 - 1601 1652 - 1.1 1.1 - 1.5 1.3 72842
Table 12: Original and Improved Kohlberg algorithms on type II games and least core payoff
n Time Iterations Subroutines Repr.
Kohlberg IKA IKAcr Kohlberg IKA IKAcr Kohlberg IKA IKAcr IKAcr
5 0.0026 0.0011 0.0013 4.7 2.2 2.2 8.2 3.1 2.2 0.7
10 1.7 0.0025 0.0023 383.2 2 1.9 791.6 2.9 1.9 1.0
15 OoT 0.081 0.081 OoT 2 2 OoT 3.1 2.4 1.4
20 - 3.5 3.5 - 1.9 1.9 - 3 2.1 1.2
25 - 111 110 - 1.8 1.8 - 2.9 2.1 1.3
26 - 313 302 - 1.9 1.9 - 2.7 2.1 1.3
27 - 534 526 - 1.8 1.8 - 2.7 1.9 1.1
28 - 2491 2318 - 2 2 - 3.3 2.4 1.4
29 - 216 214 - 1 1 - 2 2 1
30 - 1327 1299 - 1.1 1.1 - 2 1.9 1.1
The outlier values of coalitions saved from storage by IKAcr at the 30-player type I games are due to a
single game producing a tight set magnitudes larger than the average size, but this particular instance
does not effect greatly the overall picture.
H.2 Type III and IV games
As type III games are rather trivial for primal methods (such as the various Kohlberg algorithms),
it is of no surprise to find in Table 5 that the verification of type III games requires only 1 iteration
from IKA and IKAcr. Bearing this in mind it is evident that the results for type III games completely
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Table 13: Original and Improved Kohlberg algorithms on type I games and least-least core payoff
n Time Iterations Subroutines Repr.
Kohlberg IKA IKAcr Kohlberg IKA IKAcr Kohlberg IKA IKAcr IKAcr
5 0.01 0.0016 0.0013 18.7 2.5 2.5 30.9 3.2 2.5 2.2
10 1.9 0.003 0.0038 671.7 2.2 2.2 909.1 2.9 2.2 1.9
15 OoT 0.062 0.063 OoT 1.8 1.8 OoT 2.4 1.8 1.7
20 - 3.2 3.2 - 1.7 1.7 - 2 1.7 1.7
25 - 147 146 - 1.8 1.8 - 2.3 1.8 1.6
26 - 259 250 - 1.6 1.6 - 1.8 1.6 1.5
27 - 603 587 - 1.8 1.8 - 2.3 1.8 1.7
28 - 2778 2557 - 1.9 1.9 - 2.3 1.9 1.8
29 - 1302 1317 - 1.4 1.4 - 1.8 1.6 1.4
30 - 2686 2750 - 1.3 1.3 - 1.6 1.4 72842.3
Table 14: Original and Improved Kohlberg algorithms on type II games and least-least core payoff
n Time Iterations Subroutines Repr.
Kohlberg IKA IKAcr Kohlberg IKA IKAcr Kohlberg IKA IKAcr IKAcr
5 0.009 0.0015 0.0015 17.1 2.7 2.6 31.4 3.8 2.6 1.4
10 1.9 0.003 0.003 483.4 2.4 2.3 1005 3.6 2.5 1.7
15 OoT 0.1 0.1 OoT 2.4 2.4 OoT 3.4 2.5 1.7
20 - 4.7 4.7 - 2.3 2.3 - 3.3 2.4 2
25 - 211 212 - 2.7 2.7 - 4.3 2.9 2.1
26 - 451 443 - 2.5 2.5 - 3.2 2.7 2.4
27 - 817 733 - 2.3 2.3 - 3.2 2.6 2.2
28 - 3536 3307 - 2.9 2.9 - 4.6 3.1 2.2
29 - 2312 2418 - 2 2 - 3.5 2.8 2
30 - 5714 5867 - 2 2 - 3 2.7 2
coincide in the case of least, least-least core and the nucleolus: the least core outcome is already the
nucleolus. Therefore, in order to avoid unnecessary duplication, we omitted repeating tables for the
least and least-least core payoff vectors with identical content to Table 5.
The results for type IV games are very similar to type II, with a little more distinguishment in the
number of subroutines due to the increased added value of the compact representation of large tight
sets in these games.
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Table 15: Original and Improved Kohlberg algorithms on type III games and random imputation
n Time Iterations Subroutines Repr.
Kohlberg IKA IKAcr Kohlberg IKA IKAcr Kohlberg IKA IKAcr IKAcr
5 0.0007 0.0003 0.0006 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
10 0.61 0.0011 0.0014 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
15 0.024 0.023 0.023 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
20 0.94 0.92 0.93 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
25 36.5 36 36.9 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
26 75.4 76.2 75.7 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
27 158 157 158 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
28 602 623 670 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
29 116 110 114 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
30 235 225 227 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
Table 16: Original and Improved Kohlberg algorithms on type IV games and random imputation
n Time Iterations Subroutines Repr.
Kohlberg IKA IKAcr Kohlberg IKA IKAcr Kohlberg IKA IKAcr IKAcr
5 0.0006 0.0004 0.0003 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
10 0.0021 0.001 0.0008 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
15 0.024 0.023 0.023 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
20 0.94 0.93 0.93 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
25 36.5 36 36.9 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
26 75.5 76.2 75.7 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
27 158 157 158 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
28 734 736 738 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
29 116 110 108 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
30 436 448 429 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
H.3 UN Security Council game
As we mentioned above in Subsection 5.3, we introduced weighted voting games based on the UN
Security Council voting mechanism with 5 big (veto) players, while the rest of the players are small.
Weights are calibrated such that all 5 veto players’ agreement needed to pass a vote, while still approx.
half of the small players also needed. The weights are for n ≥ 7: wj = bn−32 c for j = 1, . . . , 5 and wj = 1
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Table 17: Original and Improved Kohlberg algorithms on type IV games and least core payoff
n Time Iterations Subroutines Repr.
Kohlberg IKA IKAcr Kohlberg IKA IKAcr Kohlberg IKA IKAcr IKAcr
5 0.0041 0.001 0.001 7.7 1.6 1.6 13.7 2.7 1.8 1.9
10 0.98 0.0024 0.0025 196.1 1.8 1.8 413.9 3.2 2.3 3.3
15 OoT 0.056 0.057 OoT 1.6 1.6 OoT 3.2 2.6 6
20 - 2.4 2.4 - 1.6 1.6 - 3.6 3.7 15.3
25 - 129 129 - 2 2 - 4.4 3.1 10.9
26 - 283 275 - 2 2 - 4.1 3.7 9.6
27 - 642 635 - 2.1 2.1 - 4.6 3.4 14.9
28 - 2482 2403 - 2 2 - 4.6 3.8 13.3
29 - 416 422 - 1.1 1.1 - 3.4 3.2 14.5
30 - 1454 1405 - 1.1 1.1 - 3.3 3 16.6
Table 18: Original and Improved Kohlberg algorithms on type IV games and least-least core payoff
n Time Iterations Subroutines Repr.
Kohlberg IKA IKAcr Kohlberg IKA IKAcr Kohlberg IKA IKAcr IKAcr
5 0.01 0.0009 0.0009 14.1 1.6 1.6 24.5 2.6 1.8 2.8
10 1.9 0.0025 0.0027 225.4 1.9 1.9 478.1 3.3 2.4 3.6
15 OoT 0.073 0.073 OoT 1.9 1.9 OoT 3.6 2.8 9.3
20 - 3.7 3.6 - 2.1 2.1 - 4.3 4 17.6
25 - 199 204 - 2.7 2.7 - 5.7 3.7 14.1
26 - 470 455 - 2.8 2.8 - 5.3 4.4 14.6
27 - 954 946 - 2.8 2.8 - 5.8 4 16
28 - 3569 3360 - 2.8 2.8 - 5.8 4.3 15.8
29 - 2576 2666 - 2.1 2.1 - 5.1 4.5 23.3
30 - 5888 6003 - 2 2 - 4.9 4 24.1
otherwise, the quota is q = 4w1 + n− 4, and the game is
v(S) =

1, if w(S) ≥ q,
0, otherwise.
As we noted in the introduction of the UN Security Council game in Subsection 5.3, we expect that
these games carry sufficient distinguishing power between IKA and IKAcr with its very large tight sets,
where a compact representation is vital.
9As the least-least core element coincides with the nucleolus, we omitted the former to avoid unnecessary duplication.
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Table 19: Original and Improved Kohlberg algorithms on UN Security Council game and random
imputation
n Time Iterations Subroutines Repr.
Kohlberg IKA IKAcr Kohlberg IKA IKAcr Kohlberg IKA IKAcr IKAcr
7 0.001 0.001 0.019 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
10 0.001 0.001 0.001 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
15 0.024 0.024 0.022 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
20 0.99 0.96 0.94 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
25 38.8 37.3 37.3 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
26 81.1 88.9 75.7 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
27 156 157 162 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
28 378 348 351 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
Table 20: Original and Improved Kohlberg algorithms on UN Security Council game and least core
payoff
n Time Iterations Subroutines Repr.
Kohlberg IKA IKAcr Kohlberg IKA IKAcr Kohlberg IKA IKAcr IKAcr
7 0.001 0.14 0.19 2 2 2 5 4 3 3
10 0.003 0.002 0.081 2 2 2 7 5 4 43
15 0.060 0.081 0.13 2 2 2 5 4 3 1658
20 2.8 3.3 2.8 2 2 2 7 5 4 49147
25 112 134 130 2 2 2 5 4 3 1665238
26 1259 1570 248 2 2 2 7 5 4 3145723
27 OoT 4760 2410 OoT 2 2 OoT 4 3 6644168
28 - OoM 5967 - OoM 2 - OoM 4 12582907
In the case of the nucleolus in Table 21, we can clearly see the effect of the compact representation
in IKAcr, however, it does not always translate to faster computations. This is a reasonable trade-off
between computational time and memory usage, eventually leading to IKA running out of memory for
n = 28, whereas IKAcr running out of time instead.
While we find that both methods are unable to verify the nucleolus for n = 28, the reason, IKA
running out of memory while IKAcr running out of time, differs very much in quality. It means that
with our available computational resources, and some additional time IKAcr can complete the task.
For this we find evidence in Table 20, as IKA already runs out of memory for an element of the least
core, while IKAcr is capable of completing the rejection in the second iteration. The difference is of no
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Table 21: Original and Improved Kohlberg algorithms on UN Security Council game and nucleolus
payoff9
n Time Iterations Subroutines Repr.
Kohlberg IKA IKAcr Kohlberg IKA IKAcr Kohlberg IKA IKAcr IKAcr
7 0.003 0.001 0.001 6 2 2 6 3 3 19
10 0.008 0.003 0.004 6 2 2 7 4 4 199
15 0.21 0.075 0.073 6 2 2 6 3 3 6774
20 OoT 3.2 3.1 OoT 2 2 OoT 4 4 212983
25 - 134 143 - 2 2 - 3 3 6908114
26 - 847 555 - 2 2 - 4 4 13631479
27 - 4381 5332 - 2 2 - 3 3 27615684
28 - OoM OoT - OoM OoT - OoM OoT OoT
wonder, as we can note the very high usage of our compact representation of extremely large tight sets.
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